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with Lives in the Balance
Daniel Hemel†
A central question in law and economics is whether nontax legal rules should
be designed solely to maximize efficiency or whether they also should account for
concerns about the distribution of income. This question takes on particular importance in the context of cost-benefit analysis. Federal agencies apply cost-benefit
analysis when writing regulations that generate multibillion-dollar impacts on the
U.S. economy and profound effects on millions of Americans’ lives. In the past, agencies’ cost-benefit analyses typically have ignored the income-distributive consequences of those regulations. That may soon change: on his first day in office,
President Joe Biden instructed his Office of Management and Budget to propose
procedures for incorporating distributive considerations into agencies’ cost-benefit
analyses, thus bringing renewed relevance to a long-running law-and-economics
debate.
This Article explores what it might mean in practice for agencies to incorporate
distributive considerations into cost-benefit analysis. It uses, as a case study, a 2014
rule promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
requiring new motor vehicles to have rearview cameras that reduce the risk of backover crashes. As with most major federal regulations that impose large dollar costs,
the principal benefit of the rear-visibility rule is a reduction in premature mortality.
Quantitative cost-benefit analysis typically translates mortality reductions into dollar terms based on the “value of a statistical life,” or VSL. Any distributive evaluation of the rule will depend critically on a parameter known as the “income elasticity
of the VSL,” which reflects the relationship between an individual’s income and her
willingness to pay for mortality risk reductions. Although agencies’ cost-benefit
analyses use the same VSL for all individuals regardless of income, the Department
of Transportation—of which NHTSA is a part—has issued guidance on the income
elasticity of the VSL for other purposes. When this Article applies the Department of
Transportation’s income-elasticity guidance in its distributive analysis, the rearvisibility rule appears to be regressive: it generates net costs for lower-income groups
and net benefits for higher-income groups. Rerunning the distributive analysis with
equal-dollar VSLs at all income levels, the rule appears to be progressive: lower† Professor of Law and Ronald H. Coase Research Scholar, the University of Chicago
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income individuals are the primary beneficiaries and higher-income individuals are
the losers. This Article goes on to explain why assumptions about the relationship
between income and the VSL will have important implications for distributive
analyses of other lifesaving regulations.
This Article then asks what agencies ought to do: Should they incorporate distributive objectives into cost-benefit analysis by assigning greater weight to dollars
in lower-income individuals’ hands, and should they assign different-dollar VSLs
to individuals with different incomes? The two questions are closely linked. Incorporating distributive objectives into cost-benefit analysis of lifesaving regulations
while maintaining equal-dollar VSLs for the rich and the poor will potentially produce perverse outcomes that—according to standard economic thinking—actually
redistribute from poor to rich. After canvassing options, this Article concludes that
the status quo approach—equal weights for low-income and high-income individuals’ dollars, equal-dollar VSLs for low-income and high-income individuals—
makes practical sense in light of expressive concerns, informational burdens, and
institutional constraints. This Article ends by reflecting on the case study’s lessons
for broader debates over legal system design, and it explains why the issues that
arise in the rear-visibility case study are likely to affect other efforts to redistribute
through nontax legal rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the standard method of policy
evaluation across U.S. federal executive branch agencies. Executive
Order 12,866, promulgated by President Bill Clinton in 1993, requires agencies to quantify the costs and benefits—“to the extent
feasible”—of all regulatory actions likely to have an annual effect
on the economy of $100 million or more1 and to favor regulations
for which benefits justify costs.2 Executive Order 12,866 has survived four presidential administrations—two of each party—and
has come to shape the way that agencies across the executive
branch craft their rules.3 These rules, in turn, profoundly affect
large swaths of the U.S. economy and life in the United States.
Today, CBA exerts enormous influence over the food we eat,4 the
cars we drive,5 and the air we breathe.6
Since long before CBA became standard practice across the
executive branch, scholars of the subject have argued that traditional CBA suffers from a serious flaw: it fails to account for the
distribution of income.7 This criticism has gained greater force in
an age of widening income and wealth inequality. Traditional
CBA accords the same weight to a dollar in the hands of Amazon
founder Jeff Bezos and to a dollar in the hands of a struggling
single parent living at the poverty line, even though virtually everyone agrees that the single parent has greater need for, or derives greater utility from, a dollar than Bezos does. Especially as
the top 1% and top 0.1% capture an increasing share of national

1

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738, 51,741 (Oct. 4, 1993).
Id. at 51,736.
3
On the influence of CBA, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION
15–17 (2018).
4
See, e.g., Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production,
Storage, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,030, 33,057–59 (July 9, 2009) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 16, 118) (summarizing the results of a CBA that supported the rule); Food
Labeling; Gluten-Free Labeling of Foods, 78 Fed. Reg. 47,154, 47,155 (Aug. 5, 2013) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (same); Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu
Items in Restaurants and Similar Retail Food Establishments, 79 Fed. Reg. 71,156,
71,158–59 (Dec. 1, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 11, 101) (same).
5
See infra notes 161–65 and accompanying text.
6
On the influence of CBA over federal motor-vehicle safety standards and airquality standards, see infra Part I.B.
7
For an early and influential statement, see Burton A. Weisbrod, Income Redistribution Effects and Benefit-Cost Analysis, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
177, 178–84 (Samuel B. Chase ed., 1968). See also Amartya Sen, The Discipline of CostBenefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 945–46 (2000).
2
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income,8 how can defenders of CBA continue to justify its indifference toward matters of distribution?
Responding to CBA’s perceived “distributive deficit,”9 scholars have proposed several ways to incorporate redistributive priorities into policy evaluation. The most developed of these proposals involves the application of “distributional weights” that
reflect the different social-welfare value of dollars in different individuals’ hands.10 Distributionally weighted CBA typically tallies costs and benefits in monetary terms for each individual or
income group and then applies a greater weight to costs and benefits incurred by lower-income individuals or groups. It then recommends the policy that yields the greatest weighted welfare
gains overall.11 An alternative approach, which aims to arrive at
the same result by less formal means, estimates costs and benefits for each income group and then places greater qualitative emphasis on costs and benefits incurred by lower-income groups.12
Under this latter approach, the fact that a regulation redistributes from the rich to the poor is a “soft” variable weighing in its
favor, and the fact that a regulation redistributes from poor to

8

See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
Cf. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1065–69, 1069 n.56 (2016) (criticizing law and economics generally for failing to take distributive concerns into account in nontax decisionmaking and citing CBA specifically as an area in which this “deficit” manifests).
10 For an introduction to distributional weights, see David A. Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets Organizational Design,
7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 154–58 (2015). My argument here is informed by countless hours
of conversation with Weisbach, and we both come down against distributional weights for
(different) institutional reasons, though we disagree on the use of equal-dollar versus
income-elastic values of a statistical life. See id. at 168–69 (arguing that agencies should
assign different values of a statistical life based on income).
11 See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46–60 (1st
ed. 1951); Weisbrod, supra note 7, at 190–208; PARTHA DASGUPTA, AMARTYA KUMAR SEN
& STEPHEN A. MARGLIN, GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT EVALUATION 27–35 (1972); I.M.D.
LITTLE & J.A. MIRRLEES, PROJECT APPRAISAL AND PLANNING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
48–60 (1974); Richard Layard, Commentary, On the Use of Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis, 88 J. POL. ECON. 1041, 1041–42 (1980); Robert J. Brent, Use of
Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey of Schools, 12 PUB. FIN. Q. 213,
215 (1984); Matthew D. Adler, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Overview, 10 REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 264, 265–67 (2016); Marc Fleurbaey & Rossi Abi-Rafeh,
The Use of Distributional Weights in Benefit-Cost Analysis: Insights from Welfare Economics, 10 REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 286, 290–94 (2016).
12 See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489,
1525–27 (2002).
9
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rich would be a strike against it.13 (I will use the term “hardweighted CBA” to refer to the version that assigns formal numerical weights to individuals or income groups, “soft-weighted CBA”
to refer to the version that considers redistributive effects as a
qualitative factor in CBA, and “unweighted CBA” to refer to the
traditional distribution-neutral approach.)
Support for distributionally weighted CBA in the academy is
growing.14 And interest in weighted CBA extends well beyond the
ivory tower. President Joe Biden, on his first day in office, directed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to “propose
procedures that take into account the distributional consequences
of regulations.”15 Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama took
the more modest step of allowing (but not requiring) agencies to
engage in soft-weighted CBA.16 The Trump administration, for its
part, emphasized the distributional effects of federal regulations
in its public statements—in particular, arguing for the repeal of
environmental, health, and safety regulations on the ground that
they impose a “disproportionate burden” on lower-income

13 See, e.g., ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN, DAVID H. GREENBERG, AIDAN R. VINING & DAVID
L. WEIMER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 464–65 (2d ed. 2001);
RICHARD WILLIAMS & JAMES BROUGHEL, MERCATUS CTR., PRINCIPLES FOR ANALYZING
DISTRIBUTION IN REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 2–3 (2015), https://perma.cc/6BAX-V67Y
(arguing that distributional analysis should be part of regulatory-impact analysis but
counseling against explicit weights). In an important recent contribution, Professor Richard
Revesz argues that “agencies should report distributional inequities to [the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs] alongside conventional cost-benefit analysis results.” Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1570
(2018) (emphasis in original). A rule that meets a threshold inequity level would then
trigger “either a rule change or mitigation measures.” Id. at 1571.
14 For recent endorsements of hard-weighted CBA, see, for example, MATTHEW D.
ADLER, MEASURING SOCIAL WELFARE: AN INTRODUCTION 7–10, 37, 37 n.24 (2019); Robin
Boadway, Cost-Benefit Analysis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC
POLICY 47, 50–67 (Matthew D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., 2016); and Fleurbaey &
Abi-Rafeh, supra note 11, at 290–94. For a creative and detailed proposal to incorporate a
form of soft-weighted CBA into regulatory review, see Revesz, supra note 13, at 1566–72.
15 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Modernizing
Regulatory Review, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/D8UE-7MEH. The full
instruction tells the director of OMB to produce (with representatives from other departments and agencies) recommendations that “propose procedures that take into account
the distributional consequences of regulations, including as part of any quantitative or
qualitative analysis of the costs and benefits of regulations, to ensure that regulatory initiatives appropriately benefit and do not inappropriately burden disadvantaged, vulnerable, or marginalized communities.” Id. It remains to be seen whether OMB’s proposed procedures will focus broadly on income-distributive effects or focus specifically on effects on
particular racial and ethnic communities. This Article focuses primarily on the incomedistributive dimension.
16 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735–36.
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individuals.17 Indeed, President Donald Trump told supporters in
2020 that his administration had cut a record number of regulations “because regulation is stealth taxation, especially on the
poor.”18 Although no administration has incorporated hard or soft
distributional weights into agency CBAs on a wide scale,19 and
although Republican and Democratic presidents don’t see eye to
eye on what exactly distributional analysis would entail, they appear to agree—in theory—that regulatory choices should account
for distributive concerns.20
Apart from these high-profile statements, the idea of incorporating income-distributive concerns into CBA will likely have intuitive appeal to many readers. Income inequality is a serious
problem—“the defining challenge of our time,” in President
Obama’s words.21 Federal regulations often impose costs and generate benefits in the billions of dollars.22 When deciding whether
and how to regulate, why shouldn’t agencies consider whether
these billions of dollars of benefits and burdens will be incurred
by the rich or the poor?
The case for distributionally weighted CBA encounters significant complications, however, in the context of environmental,
health, and safety regulations—by far the most expensive categories of regulations that the modern administrative state imposes.23 The challenge is this: CBA requires us to decide how

17 See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE GROWTH POTENTIAL OF
DEREGULATION 7 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/AX4H-YPZE (“[T]he burden of government regulation falls most heavily on low-income Americans, who spend a larger proportion of their income on heavily regulated goods including transportation, gasoline, utilities, food, and heath care.”). For a further argument to this effect by the former chief
economist of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, see Casey B. Mulligan,
Trumping Poverty: The President’s Rollback of Onerous Regulations Has Helped Low-Income
Americans, CITY J. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/ST95-UUXL.
18 Remarks at the 2020 Conservative Political Action Conference in National Harbor,
Maryland, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 115, at 10 (Feb. 29, 2020).
19 See Lisa A. Robinson, James K. Hammitt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Attention to
Distribution in U.S. Regulatory Analyses, 10 REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 308, 316 (2016).
20 Across the Atlantic, Her Majesty’s Treasury has already adopted hard-weighted
CBA as a permissible approach to policy evaluation. HM TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK:
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE ON APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION 28, 54–55, 97–99
(2020), https://perma.cc/QJ5P-RMZM. In 1980, the World Bank explicitly adopted hardweighted CBA for project appraisal, though implementation was somewhat scattershot.
I.M.D. Little & J.A. Mirrlees, Project Appraisal and Planning Twenty Years On, 4 WORLD
BANK REV. 351, 359 (1991).
21 Remarks at the Town Hall Education Arts Recreation Campus, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1330, 1330 (Dec. 4, 2013).
22 See infra Table 1.
23 See infra Table 1.
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many dollars we are willing to spend in order to save a life. CBA
as practiced by federal agencies accords equal value to everyone’s
dollars and equal dollar value to all lives.24 Thus, CBA as practiced by federal agencies recommends the same dollars-for-lives
trade-off no matter whose dollars and whose lives are at stake.
Distributionally weighted CBA typically does something different. It recognizes that low-income individuals and high-income
individuals make different dollars-for-lives trade-offs—not because low-income people value their lives less but because they
value their dollars more. The way that weighted CBA typically
reflects this recognition is by assigning a lower dollar value to
low-income individuals’ lives but then assigning a higher welfare
weight to low-income individuals’ dollars.25 This combination of
moves does not necessarily mean that low-income individuals’
lives carry less social value, but it does mean that distributionally
weighted CBA will often recommend different dollars-for-lives
trade-offs for low-income people and for high-income people.
To illustrate: Imagine that the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), a federal agency within the
Department of Transportation (DOT), is deciding whether to
adopt a new federal motor-vehicle safety standard that will impose a cost of $9 per vehicle and save one life per million vehicles
sold. Assume, as appears to be the case,26 that motor-vehicle manufacturers pass costs along to consumers roughly dollar for dollar.
Also assume that NHTSA uses a $10 million value of a statistical
life, or VSL. (It actually uses a slightly higher figure,27 but
$10 million has the virtue of making the math a lot easier.) Under
the status quo approach of unweighted CBA, NHTSA would compare the $9 per vehicle cost against the $10 benefit (i.e.,
1 life/1 million vehicles × $10 million/life). Since dollar benefits
exceed dollar costs, unweighted CBA would favor the regulation.

24 More precisely, CBA as practiced by U.S. federal agencies accords equal value to
all U.S. lives. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 537, 580 (2005). This Article will focus on within-country income-distributive consequences, though it is worth emphasizing that air-quality and fuel-economy regulations
would likely look much more progressive if we properly accounted for the interests of very
low-income individuals abroad.
25 See, e.g., Robin Boadway, Principles of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2 PUB. POL’Y REV. 1,
3–4, 26 (2006). It is theoretically possible to assign equal dollar values to all individuals’
lives and then to assign a higher welfare weight to low-income individuals’ dollars.
Part II.D discusses the serious problems with this approach.
26 See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
27 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Weighted CBA in its typical form would not do that. If
$10 million is the population-average VSL, weighted CBA in its
typical form will assign a VSL of less than $10 million to lowerincome individuals. For many lower-income individuals, the VSL
will be less than the $9 million necessary to render the safety
standard breakeven. There are two potential practical implications. First, weighted CBA might recommend weaker safety
standards for vehicles purchased by lower-income individuals
than for vehicles purchased by higher-income individuals. Alternatively, either because of statutory constraints or out of concern
for expressive harms, practitioners of weighted CBA might seek
to reflect the (supposed)28 interests of lower-income individuals by
adopting lower safety standards for everyone. Whatever one
thinks of either outcome as a normative matter, this is probably
not what most people have in mind when they first hear the argument that CBA should account for distributive concerns.
The challenge of valuing lives in weighted CBA is not a small
wrinkle in an odd corner of the administrative state that addresses life-and-death issues. Lifesaving regulations are not an
administrative-state sideshow—they are the main act. Really expensive regulations generally do one of three things. They (a) reduce the risk of death or serious illness from air pollution, (b) reduce the risk of death or serious injury from motor-vehicle
crashes, or (c) reduce greenhouse gas emissions.29 Note that a primary—probably the primary—reason why we worry about greenhouse gas emissions is that global warming will lead to death and
serious illness on a vast scale, so (c) is largely subsumed by (a).30
Moreover, in most of these cases, costs and benefits fall on broad
swaths of the population—the rich and the poor—so the

28 As Professor Jeremy Horpedahl notes, there is relatively little evidence that lowerincome Americans actually want lower product-safety standards. See Jeremy Horpedahl,
Do the Poor Want to Be Regulated? Public Opinion Surveys on Regulation in the United
States, 1981–2002, 180 PUB. CHOICE 27, 28–31, 36–37 (2019). Analyzing responses to regulatory-policy surveys administered from 1981 to 2002 regarding regulatory policy,
Horpedahl finds that—contrary to what one might expect on the basis of economic theory—lower-income individuals often express greater support for health and safety regulations than higher-income individuals do. See id. at 30 tbl.1. The environment is one notable exception, where support for stronger regulation is slightly higher among higherincome individuals—though remarkably robust across the board. See id.
29 See infra Table 1.
30 See, e.g., Tamma A. Carleton et al., Valuing the Global Mortality Consequences of
Climate Change Accounting for Adaptation Costs and Benefits 34 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 27599, 2020), https://perma.cc/TZK5-2CBZ (indicating that
mortality risk accounts for half or more of climate-change costs).
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challenges emphasized in the previous paragraphs are front and
center.
This Article seeks to clarify the stakes of the issue and illuminate its implications through a case study of a real-world lifesaving regulation. It focuses on NHTSA’s 2014 rear-visibility
rule, which requires new vehicles (manufactured in 2018 or later)
to include rearview cameras to reduce the number of deaths and
serious injuries resulting from backovers.31 One upside of focusing
on the rear-visibility rule is that all of the basic inputs into a distributive analysis can be gleaned from NHTSA’s own evaluation
of the rule as well as DOT data and directives.32 Most importantly,
the DOT has adopted department-wide guidance regarding the
income elasticity of the VSL, or the percent change in the VSL for
a percent change in income.33 Agencies within the DOT rely on
this guidance to make year-to-year updates to the VSL in light of
overall income growth, which they then apply across the board;
they do not draw individual-level income distinctions in their unweighted CBAs. Nonetheless, the DOT’s income-elasticity guidance allows us to see how NHTSA’s distributive analysis would
turn out if the agency used the same income-elasticity parameter
for weighted CBA that it already uses for other purposes.
The case study of the rear-visibility rule highlights several
general points. The first is that the income elasticity of the VSL
matters enormously to whether a rule survives distributionally
weighted CBA. Based on the DOT’s income-elasticity figure, the
rear-visibility rule appears to be regressive:34 it imposes net costs
on lower-income individuals and yields net benefits for higher31 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rear Visibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 19,178,
19,178 (Apr. 7, 2014) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
32 See infra Part III.C.
33 For the most recent version, see Memorandum from Molly J. Moran, Acting Gen.
Couns. & Carlos Monje, Assistant Sec’y for Transp. Pol’y, Off. of the Sec’y of Transp., U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., to Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm’rs, Guidance on Treatment of the
Economic Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) in U.S. Department of Transportation
Analyses—2016 Adjustment 8–9 (Aug. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/5Z98-TP3S.
34 There is much discussion in tax scholarship about what precisely it means for a
policy to be “regressive” or “progressive.” See, e.g., David Kamin, Note, What Is a Progressive Tax Change: Unmasking Hidden Values in Distributional Debates, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
241, 247–58 (2008); Daniel Hemel & Kyle Rozema, Inequality and the Mortgage Interest
Deduction, 70 TAX L. REV. 667, 668–70 (2017). For present purposes, I define “regressive”
as imposing net costs on low-income individuals and yielding net benefits for high-income
individuals, and I define “progressive” as the opposite. This leaves out, of course, policies
that result in net benefits or net costs across the board. As discussed in Part III.E, it is not
always so clear what scholars of regulation mean when they say a particular rule or family
of rules is “regressive.”
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income individuals. Using equal-dollar VSLs for everyone, the
conclusions flip: the rear-visibility rule appears to be quite progressive. Equal-dollar VSLs in the weighted CBA context likely
can’t be justified on economic or ethical grounds, but the 180-degree reversal of results serves to underscore the practical importance of assumptions about the income–VSL relationship. Another takeaway is that distributionally weighted CBA with
different-dollar VSLs for high-income and low-income individuals
will make it much harder for policy makers to justify lifesaving
motor-vehicle safety standards—and will potentially have a similar effect in other areas of regulation where lives are on the line.
The case study helps us to see what exactly turns on the debate
over distributionally weighted CBA and why the resolution of this
debate will have profound implications for the administrative
state.
After laying out the various approaches and showing how
they play out in the rear-visibility case, this Article offers a tentative defense of status quo CBA—both its commitment to equaldollar VSLs for all individuals regardless of income and its default approach of distribution neutrality. That defense cannot
rest entirely on efficiency grounds: status quo CBA’s commitment
to equal-dollar VSLs is inconsistent with conventional notions of
efficiency. Nor can the defense of status quo CBA rest on purely
moral or ethical grounds. I will assume (at least for purposes of
this Article) that it is a bedrock moral principle that the government should assign equal value to all lives regardless of income.35
But that bedrock moral principle does not tell us whether “value”
should be defined in dollars or in units of welfare. As this Article
illustrates, approaches to CBA that assign equal welfare-unit values to all lives nonetheless will produce different-dollar VSLs,
and approaches that assign equal-dollar VSLs to all lives may correspond to unequal welfare-unit values. So, although the principle that all lives have equal value is powerful, that principle alone
won’t resolve our challenge.
Instead, this Article offers a pragmatic defense of status quo
CBA. I argue that the status quo approach—which assigns the
same value to the lives and dollars of high-income and low-income
individuals alike—makes practical sense for U.S. federal agencies
35 Not all authors share this assumption. For a thoughtful critique of the claim that
regulators should assign the same value to all lives regardless of income and other attributes, see Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385,
424–25 (2004).
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even if its theoretical foundations are somewhat shaky. The pragmatic defense emphasizes three points:
First, approaches to CBA that assign different-dollar VSLs to
rich and poor individuals raise real concerns about expressive
harms. If we were to try to assign dollar VSLs that accurately
reflect willingness to pay for mortality risk reduction, we would
likely end up with VSLs for individuals in the top 1% of the income distribution that are somewhere between nine and eighteen
times the VSLs of other individuals.36 This doesn’t mean that topone-percenters are nine to eighteen times as valuable as average
Americans in a moral sense, but it’s not hard to imagine that VSL
differentials of that magnitude might be interpreted as implying
that the federal government cares many times more about highincome Americans than about others. Bad optics are not necessarily a reason for the government to reject a policy, but the concern here is not only about optics. It is also a concern about the
harmful—though not easily quantifiable—effects of agency procedures and policies that predictably send a message to some that
their lives are worth less.
Second, alternatives to the status quo—whether they use
different-dollar VSLs for high-income and low-income individuals, different distributional weights for high-income and low-income
individuals’ dollars, or both—entail significant informational burdens. In some cases, these burdens will simply raise data-gathering
costs for agencies—making life more difficult for agency employees but not inflicting any grievous injury. In other cases, though,
the cost and complexity of these approaches may come into conflict with other values that CBA vindicates. In particular, the
wide discretion available to practitioners of distributionally
weighted CBA will increase the risk that cognitive biases, illegitimate preferences, and interest group pressures may shape
agency decision-making.
Third, the case for distributionally weighted CBA encounters
an awkward tension between the problem that it diagnoses and
the solution that it prescribes. The case for distributionally
weighted CBA depends upon the (likely correct) assumption that
the tax system doesn’t do enough to redistribute from the rich to
the poor. But for distributionally weighted CBA to become executive branch policy, it would need the support of the president. And
if the president agrees with advocates for distributionally
36

See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
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weighted CBA that the tax system doesn’t do enough to redistribute from the rich to the poor, the president could very likely use
the tax system to redistribute more. This doesn’t necessarily depend upon congressional buy-in (though, as this Article explains,
institutional features of the tax-legislation process make it much
easier for the president to push her tax agenda through Congress
than to enact nontax legislation). Even without Congress, the
president can shift significant amounts of money across income
groups through tax regulation and tax enforcement. If we could
persuade the president to accept the key predicate for distributionally weighted CBA—that the federal government should redistribute more from the rich to the poor—then presumably we
also would want to tell her that she has much better tools at her
disposal to accomplish this goal than distributionally weighted
CBA. This doesn’t defeat the case for distributionally weighted
CBA as an nth-best redistributive mechanism, but it deprives the
argument of much of its force.
This Article’s tentative defense of equal-dollar VSLs and distribution neutrality are related though distinct. One could agree
that distributionally weighted CBA should not be used for lifesaving regulations—where it likely will require different-dollar VSLs
for the rich and the poor—but continue to believe that weighted
CBA remains appropriate for the relatively small set of high-cost
regulations that don’t affect mortality and morbidity. Alternatively, one might think that it is totally fine for regulators to prescribe different-dollar VSLs for high-income and low-income individuals yet still conclude that executive branch agencies should
practice unweighted CBA. Still, how we resolve the weighted-versus-unweighted-CBA question will have important implications
for how we assign VSLs (and vice versa). And working through
the mechanics of unweighted and weighted CBA in a representative real-world context—with both dollars and lives hanging in
the balance—will give greater clarity to the practical consequences of the different approaches and cast the status quo in a
new and more favorable light.
The rest of this Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly
summarizes the stakes. The argument for distributionally
weighted CBA responds to the stark reality of wide wealth and
income inequality. The problems that executive branch agencies
address through their most expensive regulations—road deaths,
air pollution, and global warming—are also clearly serious challenges, and the noble aspiration of CBA is to guide agencies
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toward the most efficient methods of tackling those challenges.
None of this tells us whether agencies should or shouldn’t pursue
distributionally weighted CBA or whether they should use the
same or different VSLs for individuals at different income levels.
It does serve to remind us—if such a reminder were needed—that
much rides on these questions.
Part II introduces the candidates. CBA can accord the same
weight to everyone’s dollars, or it can give greater weight to lowerincome individuals’ dollars. It can assign the same VSL to everyone or different VSLs to people of different incomes. A simple twoby-two matrix setting out the basic options serves to clarify the
choices policy makers face. One of these approaches, distributionally weighted CBA with equal-dollar VSLs, lacks any normative
foundation and produces perverse results in real-world applications. The difficult decision is whether to use unweighted CBA
with different VSLs for the rich and the poor (textbook CBA), unweighted CBA with the same VSL for everyone (status quo CBA),
or distributionally weighted CBA with higher dollar VSLs for
higher-income individuals (standard weighted CBA).
Part III presents this Article’s case study of the 2014 rearvisibility rule. After laying out the agency’s approach, Part III
considers how the rule would have fared under other forms of
CBA. It then goes on to explain why distributionally weighted
CBA with different VSLs for the rich and the poor might be expected to pose problems for other motor-vehicle safety standards
and for health and safety regulations more generally.
Part IV shifts from quantitative to normative analysis. It
takes up two questions: (1) Should CBA continue to assign the
same dollar value to everyone’s life? (2) Should CBA continue to
assign the same weight to everyone’s dollars? It emphasizes expressive concerns regarding income-differentiated VSLs as well
as information-cost concerns that apply to all the alternatives to
the status quo. Part IV also highlights institutional details of the
tax-related legislative, regulatory, and enforcement processes
that make it possible for presidents to accomplish substantial
amounts of redistribution without relying on redistributive nontax rules. Part IV does not go so far as to argue that agencies are
morally or ethically required to stick with the status quo—that
decision depends instead upon context-contingent grounds. But
in the particular context of agency rulemaking in the U.S. federal
executive branch, the case for the status quo approach
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(unweighted CBA with equal-dollar VSLs) makes a lot of practical
sense.
Part V zooms out from the regulatory context, situating the
choice between distributionally unweighted and weighted CBA
and the question of income-variant VSLs within the broader debate over the role of nontax legal rules in redistributing income.
In an influential 1994 article, Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell argued that redistribution through nontax legal rules is
typically less efficient than redistribution through income taxes
and, as a result, redistributive efforts should be channeled
through the tax system.37 That article unleashed a flood of responses proposing a range of behavioral, institutional, and political reasons why—notwithstanding Kaplow and Shavell’s formal
proof—policy makers nonetheless might favor redistribution
through nontax legal rules.38 The analysis in this Article does not
resolve that debate—indeed, if there is any crisp takeaway, it is
that the choice between nontax legal rules and the income-tax
system as channels for redistribution depends upon situational
details that defy one-size-fits-all summary. But the expressive,
informational, and institutional considerations that arise in the
rear-visibility case are not sui generis, and the analysis here
points to some of the challenges that arguments for redistributive
legal rules will need to confront.

37 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 674–75 (1994).
38 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal
Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1658–73 (1998) (arguing that redistributive legal rules may
distort work incentives less than redistributive taxes due to the way that individuals respond to uncertainty and due to the phenomenon of mental accounting); Chris William
Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 802–07 (2000) (arguing that nontax legal rules should redistribute
on dimensions other than income that are observable to the legal system but not to the tax
system); Ronen Avraham, David Fortus & Kyle Logue, Revisiting the Role of Legal Rules
and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV.
1125, 1144 (2004) (arguing that the tax-and-transfer adjustments envisioned in Kaplow
and Shavell’s formal proof would be virtually “impossible to implement”); Fennell &
McAdams, supra note 9, at 1054–55 (arguing that redistribution through nontax legal
rules may entail lower “political action costs” than redistribution through income taxes);
Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1696–98 (2018) (arguing
that economic analysis should take account of the distributive consequences of nontax legal rules when those consequences are likely to be “sticky”). But see Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules
and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 827–32 (2000) (responding to Sanchirico’s critique); David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 446–47 (2003) (arguing against use of redistributive nontax legal rules).
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Before launching into that analysis, one prefatory point merits mention. To limit this Article’s already expansive scope, I will
bracket the question whether agencies should use different VSLs
for individuals of different ages. Professor Cass Sunstein, among
others, has argued that agencies should make life-and-death decisions based on the value of a statistical life year (VSLY) rather
than VSL.39 (Several agencies within the Department of Health
and Human Services already have made this shift at least in
part.)40 I think that the case for VSLYs is overwhelmingly persuasive, and this Article’s use of VSL terminology is purely for expositional ease. Importantly, this Article’s central arguments about
redistribution and VSL all apply with equal force to VSLY.
Whether agencies use VSL or VSLY, any attempt to use distributional weights will come into tension with equal-dollar values for
safety gains to the rich and the poor. And whether agencies use
VSL or VSLY, a similar set of expressive, informational, and institutional arguments will favor an unweighted approach that
doesn’t adjust VSL or VSLY on the basis of income.
I. THE STAKES OF THE DEBATE
This Part summarizes the stakes of the debate. Part I.A offers a bird’s-eye view of income inequality in the United States.
Part I.B surveys the most expensive regulations promulgated by
federal executive branch agencies in recent years and underscores

39 Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
205, 213–25 (2004).
40 See Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, Storage, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. at 33,055; Labeling and Effectiveness Testing; Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; 76 Fed. Reg. 35,620, 35,655 (June
17, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201, 310, 352); Required Warnings for Cigarette
Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,708 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141); Use of Materials Derived from Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics, 81 Fed. Reg. 14,718, 14,729–30 (Mar. 18, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 189,
700); Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Regulatory Provisions to Promote Program Efficiency, Transparency, and Burden Reduction; Fire Safety Requirements for Certain Dialysis Facilities; Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Changes to Promote Innovation, Flexibility, and Improvement in Patient Care, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,732, 51,799–800 (Sept.
30, 2019) (to be codified in scattered parts of 42 C.F.R.) (citing Sunstein, supra note 39);
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Organ Procurement Organizations Conditions for Coverage: Revisions to the Outcome Measure Requirements for Organ Procurement Organization, 84 Fed. Reg. 70,628, 70,658 (proposed Dec. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 486); Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), and Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Additional Policy and Regulatory Revisions in Response to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg.
54,820, 54,865 (Sept. 2, 2020) (to be codified in scattered parts of 42 C.F.R.).
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the severity of the problems that they address. The purpose of this
Part is to clarify the challenge that the rest of the Article will
wrestle to resolve. We want to transfer resources from the rich to
the poor. We also want to save lives and prevent serious illness
and injury from air pollution and motor-vehicle crashes. The
question facing practitioners of CBA is how to balance these objectives when they come into conflict.
A. Income Inequality
Proposals for distributionally weighted CBA long preceded
the late-twentieth-century uptick in U.S. pre-tax income inequality.41 The case for weighted CBA, however, gains greater strength
given the widening gap between the rich and the poor. The extent
of income inequality also raises the justificatory burden for defenders of unweighted (i.e., distribution-neutral) CBA.
Just how much the gap between the rich and the poor has
widened in recent years is a subject of considerable controversy
among economists, but the richest Americans have vastly more
money than their compatriots—by any measure. For example,
economists Gerald Auten and David Splinter estimate that
households in the top 1% have, on average, more than nine times
the after-tax income of households in the other 99%.42 Economists
Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman estimate
an eighteen-to-one difference between average after-tax income
in the top 1% and the bottom 99%.43 Whether it is a difference of
ninefold, eighteenfold, or somewhere in between, the gap between
the rich and the rest is clearly very large.
The general view in welfare economics holds that the tax system is the optimal mechanism for redistributing from the rich to
the poor.44 Many (probably most) economists who study the subject would say, though, that the United States does not redistribute

41

See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 11, at 46–60; Weisbrod, supra note 7, at 190–208.
See Gerald Auten & David Splinter, Income Inequality in the United States: Using
Tax Data to Measure Long-Term Trends 35 tbl.3 (U.S. Treasury Dep’t/Joint Comm. on
Tax’n, Working Paper, Dec. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q6SP-KB2D.
43 See Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National
Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553, 575 tbl.1
(2018) (reporting a top 1% after-tax income share of 15.7% in the United States in 2014).
44 See, e.g., Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should
Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 264, 266 (1979);
Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking:
Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV.:
PAPERS & PROC. 414, 416–17 (1981).
42
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as much as it ought to. For example, Professors Peter Diamond and
Saez estimate that the optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) marginal
labor-income tax rate on the top 1% is roughly 73%,45 approximately twenty percentage points higher than the top federal-plusstate rate in the highest-tax states.46 To reach the optimum
through taxes and transfers, we would have to tax and transfer a
lot more.
Supporters of weighted CBA typically argue that in the absence of an optimal tax system, nontax regulations should serve
as a redistributive supplement. In other words, redistribution via
nontax regulations—even if not first-best—is better than the status quo. To meet this argument, defenders of unweighted CBA
need to show not only that redistribution via taxation is optimal
but also that—given the options actually available to the executive branch—agencies should refrain from pursuing redistribution through nontax rules. I think that defenders of distributionneutral CBA can carry that burden, but it requires confronting
the second-best argument head-on.
B. Lifesaving Regulations
Debates over distributionally weighted CBA are sometimes
pitched in highly abstract or stylized terms.47 For example, one
illustration of weighted CBA imagines a hypothetical policy that
“produces a single outcome: fewer pet illnesses.”48 Potentially lost

45 Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic
Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS. 165, 171 (2011).
46 The top federal statutory income tax rate is 37% from 2018 through 2025 (returning to 39.6% starting in 2026). I.R.C. § 1(a)–(d), (j). That rate does not include an additional
3.8% in Medicare- and Affordable Care Act–related taxes on top incomes. See I.R.C.
§ 1401(b) (self-employment tax); I.R.C. § 1411(a) (net-investment-income tax); I.R.C.
§ 3101(b) (hospital-insurance tax on employees); I.R.C. § 3111(b) (hospital-insurance tax
on employers). The top tax rate in California is 13.3%; the top rate in New York State is
8.82%; New York City adds 3.876%. See Taxes in California, TAX FOUND.,
https://perma.cc/WMU3-D49C; N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAX’N & FIN., INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FORM IT-201 FULL-YEAR RESIDENT INCOME TAX RETURN 49, 58–60, 69. This would add up
to 54.1% in California and 53.5% in New York City, which are the correct figures for the
net-investment-income tax but not for taxes on labor income. The slightly lower numbers
in the body text reflect the fact that the employer hospital-insurance tax and a portion of
the self-employment tax are calculated on a tax-exclusive base.
47 An important exception is Matthew D. Adler, What Should We Spend to Save Lives
in a Pandemic? A Critique of the Value of a Statistical Life, COVID ECON., June 30, 2020,
at 13–31 (2020). Adler’s conclusion—that weighted CBA with a utilitarian or prioritarian
social-welfare function will lead to substantially less investment in safety than the status
quo—is consistent with the analysis in Part III. See id. at 31 tbl.10.
48 See Williams & Broughel, supra note 13, at 3.
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in translation is what weighted CBA would mean for the most
important real-world regulations.49 This Section seeks to concretize the debate by way of a brief overview of the most expensive
federal regulations—the ones for which distributive consequences
are most likely to matter in the grand scheme of things.
Table 1 lists the twenty-four major rules promulgated by federal agencies subject to Executive Order 12,866 from October
2001 until September 2018 for which cost ranges crossed the
$1 billion threshold (in 2001 dollars).50 A momentary glance at
this list reveals that two agencies—the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the DOT—are responsible for the lion’s share
of high-dollar-cost regulations (twenty of the twenty-four). When
we talk about redistribution through regulation—and when we
focus on the highest-stakes regulations for which the distributive
consequences are likely to be most profound—we are largely talking about air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, and vehicle
safety standards. As the bandit Willie Sutton said when asked
why he robbed banks: that’s where the money is.
TABLE 1: ANNUAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MAJOR FEDERAL
RULES WITH COSTS EXCEEDING $1 BILLION, 2001–2018
Rules are presented in order of descending high-end cost estimate.
Agency Year
Rule
Benefits
Costs
(US$(2001)) (US$(2001))
EPA,
2012 2017-and21.22b–
5.31b–8.83b
DOT
Later-Model28.82b
Year LightDuty-Vehicle
GreenhouseGas (GHG) and
Corporate
Average FuelEconomy
(CAFE)
Standards
49 I will note that I actually think that a regulation that reduces pet illnesses is an
important regulation because the social-welfare function ought to include animal welfare
too. The regulation in Williams & Broughel, supra note 13, at 3, is not an “important realworld regulation” because it is not a real-world regulation. (If it were, it might well be an
important one.)
50 See
Office of Management and Budget: Reports, WHITE HOUSE,
https://perma.cc/CL39-GLD6.
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Year

EPA

2012

EPA

2007

EPA

2008

EPA,
DOT

2010

Labor

2011

EPA

2015

DOT

2005

EPA

2008

EPA

2010

DOT

2001

DOT

2009

EPA

2005

Rule
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Benefits
Costs
(US$(2001)) (US$(2001))
Mercury
and 28.19b–
8.20b
Air-Toxics
76.87b
Standards
(MATS)
Clean Air Fine 18.83b–
7.32b
Particle Imple- 167.41b
mentation Rule
National
1.58–14.93b 6.67–7.73b
Ambient-AirQuality Standards (NAAQS)
for Ozone
Light-Duty
3.9b–18.2b
1.7b–4.7b
GHG and
CAFE
Standards
Statutory
5.79b–
1.57b–4.22b
Exemption for
15.13b
Provision of
Investment
Advice
Stationary12.74b–
2.48b–2.64b
Source CO2
22.09b
Emission
Guidelines
Tire-Pressure
1.01b–1.32b 938m–2.28b
Monitoring
Systems
NAAQS
for 455m–5.20b 113m–2.24b
Lead
NAAQS
for 2.81b–
334m–2.02b
Sulfur Dioxide 38.63b
Advanced
140m–1.60b 400m–2.00b
Airbags
CAFE
Model 857m–1.91b 650m–1.91b
Year 2011
Clean Air In- 11.95b–
1.72b–1.89b
terstate Rule
151.77b
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Year

Rule

HHS

2009

DOT

2011

EPA

2013

EPA

2004

DOT

2003

Energy

2011

DOT

2010

DOT

2009

Energy

2010

EPA

2014

DOT

2007

Updates
Electronic
Transactions
Ejection
Mitigation
Hazardous Air
Pollutants—
Boilers
Control
of
Emissions from
Nonroad Diesel
Engines
and
Fuel
Hours of Service of Drivers
Energy-Efficiency Standards for Refrigerators/Freezer
s
Positive Train
Control
Roof Crush
Resistance
EnergyEfficiency
Standards for
Pool Heaters
Tier 3 MotorVehicle Emission and Fuel
Standards
Side-ImpactProtection
Upgrade
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Benefits
Costs
(US$(2001)) (US$(2001))
to 1.11b–3.19b 661m–1.45b
1.50b–2.38b

419m–1.37b

21.10b–
56.56b

1.18b–1.35b

6.85b–
59.40b

1.34b

690m

1.32b

1.66b–3.03b

803m–1.28b

34m–37m

519m–1.26b

374m–1.16b

748m–1.19b

1.27b–1.82b

975m–1.12b

3.20b–
10.64b

1.06b

736m–1.06b

401m–1.05b

Mortality and morbidity reductions generally comprise the
bulk of benefits from EPA and DOT rules other than fuel economy
standards. For example, the EPA estimated that the 2012 Mercury and Air-Toxics Standards (MATS) rule would avert 4,200 to
11,000 premature air pollution–related deaths per year; these
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mortality benefits accounted for more than 90% of the estimated
monetized benefits of the rule.51 The DOT estimated that its
ejection-mitigation rule would prevent about 373 fatalities and
476 serious injuries per year; these safety gains were the only
benefits considered in the agency’s CBA.52 Fuel-economy standards serve a wider range of purposes—including fuel savings and
energy security—though reduced carbon dioxide emissions constitute an important portion of benefits,53 and, as noted above,
mortality and morbidity are significant elements of the social cost
of carbon.54
The fact that so many high-dollar-cost rules focus on air pollution and vehicle safety should not, on reflection, be terribly surprising. Reducing deaths from air pollution and motor-vehicle
crashes are urgent policy priorities. By one estimate, nearly two
hundred thousand excess deaths in the United States each year
are attributable to just one air pollutant, fine particulate matter
(PM2.5).55 Motor-vehicle crashes killed more than thirty-six thousand people in the United States in 2019,56 and cars are by far the
leading cause of death among children and adolescents.57 We incur enormous costs to address these problems because they are
enormous problems.
51 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 77 Fed. Reg. 9,304,
9,306 tbl.2 n.b, 9,429 tbl.9 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, 63). According
to the EPA, these mortality benefits would be attributable almost exclusively to reduced
emissions of fine particulate matter rather than to a reduction in mercury and air-toxics
levels specifically. Id. at 9,306 tbl.2. The Supreme Court, in Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S.
743 (2015), found the rule to be arbitrary and capricious. See id. at 750–60. As a practical
matter, though, the rule largely had its intended effect, since most affected power plants
chose to comply with it while the litigation wended through court. See Coral Davenport,
E.P.A. to Reconsider Obama-Era Curbs on Mercury Emissions by Power Plants, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/YY3J-8XMF.
52 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation; Phase-In Reporting
Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,212, 3,214 tbl.1, 3,293 tbl.42
(Jan. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571, 585).
53 See, e.g., 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,944–45
tbl.III-105 (Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R. and 49 C.F.R.).
54 See Carleton et al., supra note 30, at 34.
55 Benjamin Bowe, Yan Xie, Yan Yan & Ziyad Al-Aly, Burden of Cause-Specific Mortality Associated with PM2.5 Air Pollution in the United States, JAMA NETWORK OPEN,
Nov. 20, 2019, at 8.
56 Early Estimates of 2019 Motor Vehicle Traffic Data Show Reduced Fatalities for
Third Consecutive Year, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (May 5, 2020),
https://perma.cc/BAP2-6R8J.
57 See Rebecca M. Cunningham, Maureen A. Walton & Patrick M. Carter, The Major
Causes of Death in Children and Adolescents in the United States, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2468, 2469 tbl.1 (2018).
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The point here is not that air pollution and motor-vehicle
crashes are larger problems than income inequality, or vice versa.
The size of a problem is not something we can measure in diameter. The point is that trade-offs between efficiency and distribution have real-world implications that abstract terms can occlude.
Perhaps our judgments on these subjects shouldn’t ultimately
turn on the particulars. But when deciding whether we should
adopt an inefficient rule in order to advance redistributive goals,
most of us would very much like to know what the inefficiency
looks like in the real world. Does it mean that cars will have inefficiently small trunks or that an inefficiently large number of passengers will die in crashes? Decisions about agency CBA procedures shouldn’t be made just in order to achieve outcomes that we
subjectively prefer, but the debate will be much enriched by attention to its practical consequences.
II. THE CANDIDATES
This Part introduces four potential approaches to CBA, which
vary in their answers to the following two questions. First, should
everyone’s dollars count the same (unweighted CBA), or should
dollars in lower-income individuals’ hands count for more
(weighted CBA)? Second, should the dollar VSL depend on a person’s income, or should the dollar VSL for everyone be the same?
The four approaches lend themselves to a simple two-by-two
matrix.
TABLE 2: FOUR APPROACHES TO CBA
Unweighted
(DistributionNeutral)
Distributional
Weights

Income-Elastic VSL
Unweighted CBA
with income-elastic
VSLs
(textbook CBA)
Weighted CBA with
income-elastic VSLs
(standard weighted
CBA)

Equal-Dollar VSL
Unweighted CBA
with equal-dollar
VSLs
(status quo CBA)
Weighted CBA with
equal-dollar VSLs

As will become clearer in the sections that follow, this twoby-two matrix doesn’t exhaust the full range of policy choices.
Within each of the bottom two boxes, there is the additional choice
of whether to pursue hard-weighted CBA (with formal distributional weights) or soft-weighted CBA (which incorporates
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distribution as a qualitative variable). Moreover, while I will focus on one standard way to assign weights to different income
groups, there are—in theory—an infinite number of possible sets
of weights. Still, any approach to CBA for lifesaving regulations
will need to answer the pair of questions that the matrix highlights. And the consequences of those two answers are likely to be
far-reaching.
A. Textbook CBA
The top left box, unweighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs,
is sometimes called “textbook” CBA.58 It is often equated with
“wealth maximization,”59 though textbook CBA and wealth maximization are not the same. This point is not purely a pedantic one:
the difference between textbook CBA and wealth maximization is
central to the debate over distributionally weighted CBA. This
Section seeks to clarify the distinction.
The key difference between textbook CBA and wealth maximization is that textbook CBA excludes changes in total wealth
that arise purely from changes in redistribution. To illustrate the
point using an example from economists Robin Boadway and
Michael Keen, consider a society in which the government redistributes from the rich to the poor via income taxation.60 Individuals choose their jobs and hours (i.e., their labor output) so as to
maximize the total value of the consumption that they can afford
and the leisure that they can enjoy. “Leisure” refers to any activity that isn’t labor—including activities that we might not think
58 E.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109
YALE L.J. 165, 172, 174 (1999); David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and
Economics Be Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 357 (2002).
59 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and
Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1153 (2000) (equating one meaning of “cost-benefit analysis” with the Kaldor-Hicks principle and describing the KaldorHicks principle as “wealth maximization”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Preference, Well-Being,
and Morality in Social Decisions, 32 J. L EGAL S TUD. 303, 304 (2003) (describing “costbenefit analysis” as a “form of wealth maximization”); Lisa Heinzerling, The Accidental
Environmentalist: Judge Posner on Catastrophic Thinking, 94 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2006)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE) (“[C]ost-benefit
analysis incorporates both the economic method and the criterion of wealth maximization
that have been Posner’s stock-in-trade.”).
60 See Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal
Income Taxation, 34 INT’L ECON. REV. 463, 465–68 (1993). The Boadway-Keen article is
just one of several to make a similar point. See, e.g., Hylland & Zeckhauser, supra note 44,
at 266–71; Vidar Christiansen, Evaluation of Public Projects Under Optimal Taxation, 48
REV. ECON. STUD. 447, 448–49 (1981). On the lineage of this argument, see LOUIS KAPLOW,
THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC FINANCE 193 (2008).
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of as “leisure,” like caring for a child or an elderly dependent.61
Imagine that there are two levels of income-earning ability (high
and low) and two levels of income (high and low). Low-ability individuals always end up in jobs that yield low income. High-ability
individuals can choose between high-income jobs with less leisure
or low-income jobs with more leisure. Note that “ability” here refers to income-earning ability, not innate ability. A highly capable
individual may be “low ability” in Boadway and Keen’s terminology—i.e., only able to take the low-paying job—for no reason other
than labor-market discrimination.
The income tax causes some high-ability individuals to
choose low-income jobs, which means that they have less money
with which to purchase private goods but more time for leisure.
When individuals reduce their labor supply in response to a distortionary income tax, total wealth declines. This phenomenon is
the familiar deadweight loss of income taxation. Ideally, we would
tax someone based on their income-earning ability rather than
their actual income. But the government can’t observe incomeearning ability, so it is relegated to redistributing on the basis of
actual income.
Now imagine that the government is deciding whether to impose a regulation that will generate more of a public good—say,
clean air. The regulation will raise costs for power plants, which
will push up the price of electricity, which in turn will leave individuals with less money to consume private goods. Textbook CBA
recommends the regulation if the total benefits—calculated on
the basis of individuals’ willingness to pay for cleaner air—exceed
the costs of compliance. Textbook CBA ignores distributive effects
(i.e., whether benefits and costs accrue to high-income or lowincome individuals).
Boadway and Keen (like several before them) observe that
when a policy alters the value of the public good–private good
bundle associated with a given amount of income, individuals
may alter their labor–leisure choices.62 For example, let’s say that
low-income individuals are disproportionately harmed by air pollution (e.g., because they lack air conditioners and so need to keep
their windows open in the summer).63 A regulation that results in
61 See Daniel J. Hemel & David A. Weisbach, The Behavioral Elasticity of Tax Revenue, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 381, 386 (2021).
62 See Boadway & Keen, supra note 60, at 469.
63 See Mercedes Medina-Ramón, Antonella Zanobetti & Joel Schwartz, The Effect of
Ozone and PM10 on Hospital Admissions for Pneumonia and Chronic Obstructive
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cleaner air will thus increase the value of the public good–private
good bundle for low-income individuals. A high-ability person who
is choosing between (a) a high-income job with less leisure and
(b) a low-income job with more leisure will be somewhat more
likely to choose option (b) where the air is cleaner. The lower-income job leaves the person with less money to purchase private
goods such as air conditioning, but living without air conditioning
is somewhat more pleasant now that the air is cleaner.
When some individuals switch from labor to leisure in the
presence of a distortionary tax, total wealth goes down. But textbook CBA doesn’t count that decline in total wealth as a cost.
Textbook CBA implicitly recognizes that we can almost always
increase total wealth by redistributing less. Since textbook CBA
doesn’t account for changes in redistribution, it also doesn’t count
changes in total wealth resulting purely from changes in redistribution. In this sense, textbook CBA is symmetrical: it applies the
same treatment to the benefits of redistribution and the costs of
redistribution (which is to say, it ignores both).
But this raises the question: What exactly is textbook CBA
measuring? It’s not measuring the change in total wealth as a result of the regulation, because the change in total wealth would
include changes in deadweight loss due to changes in redistribution. It’s also not measuring the change in total welfare, because
the change in total welfare would depend on distributive effects,
which textbook CBA also ignores. It’s often said to be measuring
“efficiency,”64 but what is efficiency if not wealth maximization or
welfare maximization?65

Pulmonary Disease: A National Multicity Study, 163 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 579, 581–83
(2006) (finding that the relationship between particulate-matter exposure and hospital
admissions is stronger in high-poverty areas but that the association disappears once central air conditioning is added as a control variable); Michelle L. Bell, Keita Ebisu, Roger
D. Peng & Francesca Dominici, Adverse Health Effects of Particulate Air Pollution: Modification by Air Conditioning, 20 EPIDEMIOLOGY 682, 683, 684 tbl.2 (2009) (finding that
access to air conditioning reduces vulnerability to particulate matter).
64 See Aidan R. Vining & David L. Weimer, Efficiency and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 417, 417 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., 2006).
65 Defining the efficiency objective of textbook CBA as “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency” still
leaves the question of what Kaldor and Hicks meant. Economist Nicholas Kaldor’s threepage paper in the September 1939 issue of the Economic Journal does not address the
treatment of deadweight loss from redistribution. See generally Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare
Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549
(1939). Economist Sir John Richard Hicks actually did anticipate the problem on the last
page of his contribution to the same journal’s December 1939 issue, but he did not propose a
solution. See J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 712 (1939):
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Professor Louis Kaplow, in a series of papers, has proposed a
conceptual tool that clarifies what exactly textbook CBA
measures.66 Kaplow suggests the following: Imagine that, upon
implementing the air-pollution regulation, the government also
adjusts the tax schedule so that everyone’s utility is the same as
it had been immediately prior to the regulation. So, for example,
if the regulation yields benefits for low-income individuals, the
government will raise taxes on (or reduce transfers to) low-income
individuals such that they are just as well-off as before. At the
end of the day, after all these benefit-offsetting tax adjustments,
the value of the public good–private good bundle for low-income
individuals will not have changed. Thus, labor incentives will not
have changed: high-ability individuals face the same trade-off between more income versus more leisure. If the rule’s benefits
(cleaner air) exceed its costs (more expensive electricity)—that
is, if the rule generates positive net benefits—then the benefitoffsetting tax adjustments will leave the government with more
revenue. If the rule’s costs exceed its benefits, then the benefitoffsetting tax adjustments will leave the government with less
revenue. By looking at the change in government revenue after
the hypothetical benefit-offsetting tax adjustment, we can determine whether the rule passes textbook CBA.
Importantly, no part of this analysis depends on whether
benefit-offsetting tax adjustments actually occur. I will relegate
to the margin a discussion of whether, when, and why we might
expect them to occur or not to occur.67 For the sake of argument,
Since almost every conceivable kind of compensation (re-arrangement of taxation, for example) must itself be expected to have some influence on production,
the task of the welfare economist is not completed until he has envisaged the
total effects of both sides of the proposed reform; he should not give his blessing
to the reform until he has considered these total effects and judged them to be
good. If, as will often happen, the best methods of compensation feasible involve
some loss in productive efficiency, this loss will have to be taken into account.
66 See Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost
of Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513, 515–16 (1996); Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)relevance of
Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government Policy, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS. 159,
160–64 (2004); Louis Kaplow, A Unified Perspective on Efficiency, Redistribution, and Public Policy, 73 NAT’L TAX J. 429, 433–37 (2020).
67 Much of the criticism of distribution-neutral CBA targets the assumption that
benefit-offsetting tax adjustments will occur. See, e.g., Avraham et al., supra note 38, at
1144–48; Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, Inversion Aversion, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
797, 806 (2019); Zachary Liscow, Are Court Orders Sticky? Evidence on Distributional Impacts from School Finance Litigation, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 33–5 (2018); Liscow,
supra note 38, at 1653–54 (arguing that nontax legal rules should diverge from KaldorHicks efficiency when “distributional impacts stick”). As emphasized in the main text, the

2022]

Regulation and Redistribution with Lives in the Balance

675

let’s stipulate that they do not. The primary purpose here of the
benefit-offsetting-tax-adjustment construct is not to predict political outcomes or to provide a normative justification for textbook
CBA. It is simply to explain what counts as a “cost” or “benefit” in
textbook CBA and what does not. The benefit-offsetting tax adjustment gives us a way to describe textbook CBA regardless of
whether there are benefit-offsetting tax adjustments—in much
the same way as, say, per capita gross domestic product gives us
a way to describe a country’s wealth even though countries don’t
really split up their wealth on a per capita basis.
Three other observations about textbook CBA merit mention.
The first observation—and a key implication of Boadway and
Keen’s model—is that when the income-tax system is optimal,
textbook CBA gives us not only the efficiency-maximizing policy
prescription but also the welfare-maximizing policy prescription
(subject to one caveat addressed in a moment).68 The “optimal” tax
system is one that redistributes from the rich to the poor up to
the point that the welfare gains from additional redistribution
equal the welfare losses from additional labor–leisure distortion
argument for distribution neutrality does not depend on this assumption. Still, it is interesting to consider whether benefit-offsetting tax adjustments might happen.
One reason to think that rough adjustments might occur in the aggregate and in the
long run—i.e., that more redistribution through one channel might lead to less redistribution through another—is that demand for redistribution depends upon the extent of income inequality. In a perfectly egalitarian society, there would be no demand for redistribution because there would be no inequality for redistribution to address. As we move
toward (or away from) egalitarianism, demand for redistribution decreases (or increases).
Thus, additional redistribution may reduce demand for redistribution.
A reason to think that adjustments might not occur is that redistribution itself affects
the political system’s responsiveness to changes in demand for redistribution. When the
rich have a disproportionate share of resources, they are likely to wield a disproportionate
share of political power, thus allowing them to push back forcefully against redistributive
efforts. Under these circumstances, the political system is less likely to respond to redistributive demands. If the distribution of resources is less lopsided, then the rich may exert
less political power, and demands for redistribution may be more likely to succeed. Thus,
a reduction in redistribution may make it more difficult to redistribute, and an increase
in redistribution may beget more redistribution.
Which of these two stories is correct? Both arguments are plausible in theory, and both
are likely true to some extent. But, once more, nothing about the argument for distributionneutral CBA depends on the assumption that benefit-offsetting tax adjustments occur. Cf.
Shavell, supra note 44, at 417 (“Now, of course, no one would really expect the income tax
structure to be adjusted in response to each and every change in legal rules (much less to
individual changes in other domains), for this would be impractical.”). The construct of the
benefit-offsetting tax adjustment serves to illustrate the important point that textbook
CBA is symmetrical (i.e., textbook CBA ignores both the benefits and costs of changes in
redistribution). This important point remains true as a description of textbook CBA regardless of how redistribution evolves in the real world.
68 See Boadway & Keen, supra note 60, at 469.
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(i.e., deadweight loss). When the tax system is optimal, society as
a whole is indifferent between (a) a little bit more redistribution
with a concomitant increase in deadweight loss and (b) a little bit
less redistribution with a corresponding reduction in deadweight
loss. If an air-pollution regulation increases the value of the public good–private good bundle available to low-income individuals,
then it will cause some high-ability individuals to choose to work
less. But instead of trying to calculate the benefit of additional
redistribution and the cost of deadweight loss, we can ignore both
(because if the tax system is optimal, we’re indifferent to sufficiently small changes in redistribution and deadweight loss).
Second—and this is the crucial caveat to Boadway and Keen’s
conclusion—this equation between textbook CBA and welfare
maximization depends on the assumption that individuals with
the same income assign the same value to clean air regardless of
their income-earning ability. In technical terms, this assumption
holds that utility is “weakly separable” between leisure and private and public goods.69 Although this weak-separability assumption is unlikely to be correct in all cases, deviations from weak
separability don’t disprove the general case for textbook CBA.
To see why, imagine that the public good in question is not
cleaner air but better public transit. The government decides
that, because low-income individuals ride public transit more often, it will redistribute from the rich to the poor by using tax dollars to improve buses and subways. Say that low-ability individuals with low incomes assign greater value to public transit than
high-ability individuals with low incomes (e.g., because highability individuals with low incomes don’t work as much, so they
commute less). Providing better public transit adds to the public
good/private good bundle of low-ability individuals with low incomes, but it doesn’t add much to the public good/private good
bundle of high-ability individuals with low incomes, so it doesn’t
cause many high-ability individuals to reduce their labor supply.
Thus, improving public transit doesn’t create as much deadweight
loss as, say, monetary transfers to low-income individuals.
Or imagine the reverse: Say that the government decides
that, because high-income people are exercising on their Pelotons
while low-income people are out on the bike paths, it will redistribute from the rich to the poor by using tax dollars to improve
bike paths. Let’s say that low-ability individuals with low incomes
69

Id. at 471 & n.9.
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assign less value to bike paths than high-ability individuals with
low incomes (e.g., because members of the former group have less
leisure time for cycling outside). So, improving bike paths doesn’t
do as much to reach the people to whom we want to redistribute—
low-ability individuals with low incomes—but it causes some
high-ability individuals to reduce their labor supply. High-ability
individuals who switch to the low-income job might not be able to
afford Pelotons any longer, but they would prefer more leisure time
with scenic bike paths rather than less leisure time plus Pelotons.
Summing up, there may be instances in which providing lowincome individuals with public goods (e.g., better public transit)
leads to less deadweight loss than simply transferring cash, and
there may be instances in which providing low-income individuals
with public goods (e.g., public bike paths) leads to more
deadweight loss than cash transfers. The advocate for textbook
CBA can accept this caveat and say that, as a practical matter,
textbook CBA still provides a good first cut in the benchmark
case. That is, we can assume that if a regulation redistributes
from high-income individuals to low-income individuals, it generates the same deadweight loss as tax-system redistribution (the
inverse is also true: if it redistributes from low-income individuals
to high-income individuals, it yields the same reduction in
deadweight loss as a tax cut would). Moreover, when the weakseparability assumption does not apply—when public goods are
like public transit (complementary to labor) or public bike paths
(complementary to leisure)—the result could be that we should
choose more-redistributive policies than textbook CBA suggests
or that we should choose less-redistributive policies. Often, it will
be ambiguous whether a particular public good is a complement
to labor or leisure, in which case we have no reason to deviate
either way from textbook CBA’s prescription.70
A third and final observation about textbook CBA bears emphasis. Textbook CBA relies on individuals’ own dollar valuations
of the public good. In the example above, the public good is clean
air, and the principal benefit of the public good is that breathing
cleaner air reduces the probability of death from pneumonia,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, heart attack, stroke, and
70 For a suggestion that clean air is complementary to leisure and thus that we
should provide less of it than textbook CBA would prescribe, see Christos Makridis, The
Elasticity of Air Quality: Evidence from Millions of Households Across the United States,
37 (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 15-020
2015), https://perma.cc/UW4Z-UWPS.
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other causes.71 Individual dollar valuations of the public good will
therefore be based on willingness to pay for mortality risk reduction. As discussed at greater length in Part III.C.3, higher-income
individuals typically are willing to pay more for mortality risk reductions than lower-income individuals.72 Textbook CBA therefore
assigns higher values to mortality benefits when those benefits
accrue to higher-income individuals. It uses income-elastic VSLs
rather than equal-dollar VSLs for everyone.
B. Status Quo CBA
Status quo CBA, or real-world CBA, tracks textbook CBA in
all respects except one. Status quo CBA also eschews the use of
distributional weights and is symmetrical (i.e., it ignores both the
welfare benefits and deadweight loss of redistribution). But
whereas textbook CBA values benefits and costs based on willingness to pay, status quo CBA assigns the same dollar VSL to everyone regardless of income.
Agencies typically derive VSLs from hedonic wage studies,
which seek to estimate “compensating wage differentials” for jobs
with different levels of fatality risk.73 Say that a job in logging
carries with it a 0.1% annual risk of death while an otherwise
equivalent job in roofing carries a 0.05% annual risk of death.
Let’s say the job in logging will (all else equal) pay an extra $5,000
per year over and above roofing.74 The VSL is the wage differential divided by the risk differential—in this example,
$5,000 ⁄ 0.05% = $10 million. Recent agency rulemakings use
VSLs slightly above $10 million.75

71

See Bowe et al., supra note 55, at 10.
See Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi & James P. Ziliak, Policy Relevant Heterogeneity in the Value of Statistical Life: New Evidence from Panel Data Quantile Regressions, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 15, 28 tbl.2 (2010).
73 Lisa A. Robinson, How US Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk Reductions,
1 REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 283, 284 (2007).
74 These figures for logging and roofing are very close to reality. See U.S. BUREAU OF
LAB. STAT., CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES: HOURS-BASED FATAL INJURY
RATES BY INDUSTRY, OCCUPATION, AND SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, 2018
(2018), https://perma.cc/Y62J-8Y55. Logging is remarkably dangerous.
75 See Medicare and Medicaid Programs, Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), and Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Additional Policy and Regulatory Revisions in Response to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg.
54,820, 54,865 (Sept. 2, 2020) (to be codified in scattered parts of 42 C.F.R.) ($10.1 million);
The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174, 24,827 (Apr. 30, 2020) (to be codified
in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R. and 49 C.F.R.) ($10.4 million).
72
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Status quo CBA’s equal-VSL-for-all approach may strike
many readers as sensible (subject, perhaps, to the caveat regarding lives versus life-years at the outset)76. And, as I argue in
Part IV, it is sensible (subject, again, to the lives versus life-years
caveat). But it creates a conceptual problem for which status quo
CBA doesn’t have a good solution.
The problem is that status quo CBA doesn’t correspond to any
obvious normative principle. Textbook CBA can be described as a
measure of efficiency, with efficiency defined through the benefitoffsetting-tax-adjustment construct. But status quo CBA can’t be
characterized that way. Efficiency depends on income-elastic
VSLs, and status quo CBA ignores the income elasticity of the
VSL. Status quo CBA also can’t be characterized as a welfare
measure. Welfare depends upon distribution, and status quo CBA
ignores distribution. To be sure, the task of federal agencies isn’t
to implement abstract theories of the good; it is to adopt procedures and policies that work well in the real world. So, status quo
CBA’s lack of conceptual clarity is not necessarily a fatal flaw. But
defenders of status quo CBA do start out on shaky theoretical
ground, whether or not they ultimately can win an argument
pitched in pragmatic terms.77
C. Weighted CBA with Income-Elastic VSLs
A third general approach to CBA involves the use of distributional weights and income-elastic VSLs. As noted at the outset,
distributional weights can be applied qualitatively (soft-weighted
CBA) or quantitatively (hard-weighted CBA). I will focus first on
the hard-weighted approach and then discuss the softer iteration.
Hard-weighted CBA derives distributional weights from a
social-welfare function.78 The social-welfare function most commonly used in academic versions of hard-weighted CBA is based
on utilitarianism.79 (This is also the approach recommended by

76

See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
For a criticism of status quo CBA along these lines, see Adler, supra note 47, at 32–33.
78 Some scholars use the term “SWF framework” to describe what I refer to as
“weighted CBA” and use “CBA” to refer exclusively to unweighted CBA. See, e.g., Adler,
supra note 14, at 7.
79 Cf. Michael W. Jones-Lee & Graham Loomes, Discounting and Safety, 47 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 501, 505 (1995); Christian Azar, Weight Factors in Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Climate Change, 13 ENV’T & RES. ECON. 249, 252–256 (1999); Adler, supra note 14, at 10–
11, 15.
77
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the U.K. Treasury.)80 With a utilitarian social welfare function,
the social value of an additional dollar in a person’s hands depends on that person’s marginal utility of income. A utilitarian
approach to weighted CBA will assign distributional weights that
correspond to the marginal utility of income.
Studies of labor-market behavior81 and self-reports of personal well-being82 suggest that the relationship between utility
and income is roughly logarithmic (i.e., the utility of income is the
natural log of income). This assumption has the virtue of arithmetic convenience as well as empirical support. The first derivative of the natural log of y is equal to 1/y (a fact that many of us
learned in high school but since have banished to the recesses of
our memory). Thus, if person A earns 10 times as much as person
B, the marginal utility of income to person A is 1/10 the marginal
utility of income to person B. If distributional weights are based
on a utilitarian social-welfare function with logarithmic utility of
income, then an individual’s weight will straightforwardly be the
inverse of her income (or, in some iterations, the inverse of her
income multiplied by the population mean income).
To illustrate how the utilitarian version of hard-weighted
CBA might work, imagine that Bezos’s income is one hundred
thousand times the average American’s. (This is likely an underestimate.)83 Thus, if the average American’s distributional weight
is 1, Bezos’s distributional weight will be 1/100,000. Now let’s say
that a regulation yields a benefit worth $1 to a single average
American and imposes a cost of $90,000 on Bezos. The total
welfare-unit effect would be 1 × $1 = 1 welfare unit for the average American and 1/100,000 × −$90,000 = −0.9 welfare units for
Bezos, or (positive) 0.1 welfare units in total. The regulation
would narrowly pass hard-weighted CBA, though it would flunk
unweighted CBA by an $89,999 margin.
Logarithmic utility of income also has important implications
for the income elasticity of the VSL. If Bezos derives the same
utility from his own life as the average American derives from her
life, and if Bezos derives only 1/100,000th as much utility from
80 See HM Treasury, supra note 20, at 78–79 (using distributional weights based on
marginal utility of income of 1.3).
81 See Raj Chetty, A New Method of Estimating Risk Aversion, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
1821, 1830 (2006).
82 See Néstor Gandelman & Rubén Hernández-Murillo, Risk Aversion at the Country
Level, 97 FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 53, 55 (2015).
83 See Prachi Bhardwaj, Jeff Bezos Got So Rich in 2018 That He Now Makes More per
Minute than You Do in a Year, MONEY.COM (Dec. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/3NSB-FGJB.
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his marginal dollar as the average American derives from her
marginal dollar, then—at the margin—Bezos should be willing to
pay 100,000 times as much as the average American would pay
for an equivalent reduction in fatality risk. More generally, if everyone values their own life equally in utility terms and the marginal
utility of income is inverse to income, then VSLs will be proportional to income. An x-percent increase in income will lead to an
x-percent increase in VSL. That is, the income elasticity of the
VSL will be one.
One convenient feature of hard-weighted CBA with weights
inverse to income and an income elasticity of the VSL equal to one
is that even though it assigns different-dollar VSLs to different
individuals’ lives based on their income, it assigns the same
welfare-unit weight to everyone’s life regardless of income. If the
average American’s VSL is $10 million and Bezos’s income is
100,000 times the average American’s, then Bezos’s incomeelastic VSL will be $1 trillion. If the average American’s distributional weight is one, Bezos’s weight will be 1/100,000. Thus, hardweighted CBA would assign a value of ten million welfare units
to the average American’s life and 1/100,000 × $1 trillion welfare
units to Bezos’s life. Not coincidentally, 1/100,000 × $1 trillion = $10 million. In welfare-unit terms, every life is valued
equally.84
In the discussion that follows, I will refer to hard-weighted
CBA with weights inverse to income and an income elasticity of
the VSL equal to one as “standard hard-weighted CBA.” Standard
hard-weighted CBA means that when a person’s income doubles,
that person’s VSL also doubles, and the distributional weight assigned to that person declines by half. Standard hard-weighted
CBA reflects only one of an infinite number of assumptions we
might make about distributional weights and the income elasticity of VSLs (IEVSLs),85 though—as will become clearer below—it
has particularly attractive arithmetic and normative properties.
Importantly, what I refer to as “standard hard-weighted
CBA” is not identical to the application of a utilitarian social-

84 See Rachel Baker, Susan Chilton, Michael Jones-Lee & Hugh Metcalf, Valuing
Lives Equally: Defensible Premise or Unwarranted Compromise?, 36 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 125, 131 (2008); Matthew D. Adler, James K. Hammitt & Nicolas Treich,
The Social Value of Mortality Risk Reduction: VSL Versus the Social Welfare Function
Approach, 35 J. HEALTH ECON. 82, 88–90 (2014).
85 For a comprehensive and insightful overview of potential social-welfare functions,
see Adler, supra note 14, at 83–113.
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welfare function even when utility is logarithmic in income. This
is so for at least three reasons. First, standard hard-weighted
CBA relies on the assumption that high-income and low-income
individuals value their lives equally in utility terms. It is possible
that high-income individuals derive greater utility from being
alive because of the pleasantness of being rich.86 Second, lifesaving may generate a positive fiscal externality (i.e., extra tax revenue) if the individual whose life is saved goes on to pay more in
taxes than she receives in transfers. With a progressive tax system, higher-income individuals are likely to be larger net payers.
Utilitarianism might therefore assign a higher value to the lives
of high-income individuals than standard hard-weighted CBA.
Third, utilitarianism would potentially assign different values to
a 10% change in one person’s survival probability and a 1%
change in 10 people’s survival probability. Hard-weighted CBA
does not account for nonlinear effects of this sort.87
Finally, hard-weighted CBA must decide how to handle
deadweight loss resulting from increases in redistribution.88 Conceptually, the answer seems clear enough: if deadweight loss is
the byproduct of redistribution and hard-weighted CBA counts an
increase in redistribution as a welfare gain, then hard-weighted
CBA should acknowledge the corresponding increase in
deadweight loss as a welfare loss. Otherwise, hard-weighted CBA
is having its proverbial cake and eating it too—counting the benefits of redistribution but not the costs. Somewhat surprisingly,
even highly sophisticated applications of hard-weighted CBA to
risk analysis generally do not account for deadweight loss resulting from redistribution.89 In this sense, they are asymmetrical,
including only the benefits of redistribution and not the costs.90
86 See Louis Kaplow, The Value of a Statistical Life and the Coefficient of Relative
Risk Aversion, 31 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 23, 25 (2005) (“The value of preserving one’s life
is higher when income is higher, because utility is accordingly higher. This suggests that
the income elasticity of VSL should tend to exceed [the coefficient of relative risk aversion.]”).
87 I thank Matthew Adler for this point.
88 See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., HM Treasury, supra note 20, at 78–81; Adler, supra note 14, at 172–192;
Adler, supra note 47, at 39–45; cf. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan
S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1639–45
(2013) (noting the direct effect of regulation on involuntary unemployment but omitting
its effect on the labor–leisure trade-off in well-being-unit analysis of EPA regulation).
90 Professor Nathaniel Hendren proposes a method for distributional weights that
would restore symmetry on the assumption that the existing tax system is optimal. See
Nathaniel Hendren, Measuring Economic Efficiency Using Inverse-Optimum Weights, J.
PUB. ECON., at 8–9 (July 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/6UAZ-6PSJ. As Hendren notes, his
approach would converge to textbook CBA when weak separability applies. See id. app. H.
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This might be justifiable if one assumes that deadweight loss does
not matter at all in the real world, but that assumption would be
hard to sustain. We have increasingly compelling evidence that
individuals adjust their labor supply in response to redistribution
(though how much they adjust their labor supply is a subject of
fierce debate).91 And the more explicitly that agencies seek to redistribute from the rich to the poor, the more likely it is that individuals will adjust their income-earning and income-reporting
behavior.
Soft-weighted CBA seeks to push policy in the direction of
hard-weighted CBA without explicit use of distributional weights.
Practitioners of soft-weighted CBA thus would compare net benefits and costs across the income distribution and favor policies
with larger net benefits for lower-income individuals. The rationale for doing this qualitatively rather than quantitatively is,
presumably, that it makes the math easier—though, as illustrated below, soft-weighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs may
entail greater informational burdens in some cases than the hardweighted approach.
D. Weighted CBA with Equal-Dollar Values of a Statistical Life
The option in the bottom right box (weighted CBA with equaldollar values of a statistical life) is presented primarily for completeness. As noted above and explored in greater detail in
Parts III and IV, the rationale for weighted CBA with equal-dollar
VSLs is elusive. If we thought that lower-income individuals were
irrationally undervaluing fatality risk reduction, then perhaps
there would be a paternalistic case for weighted CBA with equaldollar VSLs. But it is entirely rational to assign a higher value to
one’s dollars when one has fewer dollars, and that means that
lower-income individuals really should be less willing than
higher-income individuals to part with their dollars in exchange
for equivalent safety improvements. It is, by the same token, entirely rational for readers of this Article to be unwilling to pay for
Thus, the prescriptions it yields would not be redistributive in a conventional sense (i.e.,
it would not necessarily shift resources from the rich to the poor and might do the reverse).
91 See, e.g., Raj Chetty, Adam Guren, Day Manoli & Andrea Weber, Are Micro and
Macro Labor Supply Elasticities Consistent? A Review of Evidence on the Intensive and
Extensive Margins, 101 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 471, 472–74 (2011); Raj Chetty,
Bounds on Elasticities with Optimization Frictions: A Synthesis of Micro and Macro Evidence on Labor Supply, 80 ECONOMETRICA 969, 992–1014 (2012). For an impressively
thorough overview of the literature, see generally Michael P. Keane, Labor Supply and
Taxes: A Survey, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 961 (2011).
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fatality risk reductions that Bezos would very happily purchase,
and few of us would think that we would be better off if compelled
to follow Bezos’s preferences in our own lives.
Weighted CBA with equal-dollar VSLs may push policy makers toward regulations that lower-income individuals would rationally reject. Weighted CBA with equal-dollar VSLs also will
encounter further ethical quandaries in Part IV. For now,
weighted CBA with equal-dollar VSLs serves as a placeholder,
but it will not be a serious candidate by the end.
III. CBA AND REDISTRIBUTION: A CASE STUDY
To see what these various approaches to CBA might mean in
the real world, it will be helpful to work through a concrete example. For that purpose, I will use NHTSA’s 2014 rear-visibility
rule. Part III.A provides an overview of that rule. Part III.B discusses NHTSA’s approach. Part III.C considers the rule’s distributive effects and how those distributive effects might be incorporated into CBA. Part III.D then imagines how NHTSA might
implement the results of distributionally weighted CBA for the
rear-visibility rule. Part III.E assesses the generalizability of
these results.
A. The Case of the Rear-Visibility Rule
In 2008, Congress passed and President George W. Bush
signed the Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act
of 200792 (K.T. Safety Act),which instructed NHTSA to promulgate rear-visibility requirements that “reduce death and injury
resulting from backing incidents, particularly incidents involving
small children and disabled persons.”93 The statute did not tell the
agency precisely how to carry out this task but, instead, authorized the agency to “prescribe different requirements for different
types of motor vehicles.”94 It also urged the agency to consider
mirrors, sensors, and other technologies, like backup cameras.95
The K.T. Safety Act started a lengthy rulemaking process
that culminated in 2014.96 In April of that year, NHTSA promulgated a new federal motor-vehicle safety standard—the rear-

92
93
94
95
96

Pub. L. No. 110-189, 122 Stat. 639.
K.T. Safety Act § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 640.
K.T. Safety Act § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 640.
K.T. Safety Act § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 640.
The agency published its proposed rule at 75 Fed. Reg. 76,186 (Dec. 7, 2010).
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visibility rule—requiring motor vehicles manufactured after 2018
to be equipped with cameras allowing drivers to see behind
them.97 The rule applies to all passenger cars, trucks, multipurpose passenger vehicles, buses, and low-speed vehicles weighing
less than ten thousand pounds.98 The rule generally requires new
vehicles to display an image covering a ten-by-twenty-foot area
behind the rear bumper.99
The rule provides a particularly apt example to illustrate the
relationship between CBA and income redistribution for several
reasons. First, the rule is broadly representative of the sorts of
high-cost regulations that federal agencies impose. It generates
monetary costs (here, the additional cost of equipping new motor
vehicles with cameras) in exchange for health and safety benefits
(here, fewer deaths and injuries from backovers). Although not
above the $1 billion threshold for Table 1, it is similar to other
high-cost regulations promulgated by the DOT and the EPA, the
two agencies that account for the lion’s share of total regulatory
costs.100
Second, the rule was a close call. Although NHTSA found that
monetized costs exceeded benefits, the agency said that it considered there to be “significant unquantifiable considerations” that
nonetheless justified the rule—in particular, “the young age of
many victims and the fact that many drivers involved in backover
crashes are relatives or caretakers of the victims.”101 Those unquantifiable considerations tipped the balance in favor of the
camera requirement. If the agency had considered the rule’s income-distributive effects, that consideration plausibly could have
tipped the balance back.
Third, the costs and benefits of the rule are costs and benefits
that distributive analysis is reasonably well equipped to address.
97 79 Fed. Reg. 19,178 (Apr. 7, 2014). For a detailed and informative account of the
rule’s development, see Cass R. Sunstein, Rear Visibility and Some Unresolved Problems
for Economic Analysis (with Notes on Experience Goods), 10 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
317, 320–24, 330–39 (2019).
98 79 Fed. Reg. at 19,244.
99 See id. at 19,195.
100 See supra Table 1.
101 79 Fed. Reg. at 19,184. In theory, NHTSA could have tried to quantify those benefits too (e.g., by using a higher dollar VSL when the lives saved are children or by using
the value of a statistical life year to account for the age distribution of avoided deaths). See
Sunstein, supra note 97, at 333. That it did not do so is somewhat surprising. Sunstein,
who was the head of OIRA at the time of the proposed rule, explains that “within the
Obama Administration, there was general agreement that this approach was sufficient for
a proposed rule, designed for public comment.” Id.
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Most of the people affected by the rule are alive today or will be
born not too long from now. The rule therefore does not raise the
sorts of difficult questions regarding obligations to future generations that might be implicated by a rule regarding, say, radioactive nuclear-waste storage. It actually does raise difficult questions about obligations to non–human beings—since some of the
avoided backovers would have involved dogs, cats, and other
domesticated and wild animals—but I will set aside that (important)102 consideration for present purposes.
Fourth, the rule is familiar. Most of us have likely traveled in
cars equipped with rearview cameras required by the rule.
(Though the rule applies to all vehicles manufactured on or after
May 1, 2018, carmakers were required to install cameras in a percentage of their vehicles starting in 2016.)103 Many of us have
likely read about the rule in newspapers104—or, perhaps, in law
reviews.105 We can comprehend, analyze, and argue about the various moving pieces without becoming experts on a totally new
subject.
Fifth and finally, the rule is one that several scholars have
identified as a regressive regulation. Economists James Bailey,
Diana Thomas, and Joseph Anderson characterize the rear-visibility
rule as a regulation “designed to achieve an outcome higherincome households desire” while imposing costs on all income
groups.106 Thomas, in a separate piece, cites the rule as an example of a regulation that “imposes the preferences of the rich on
lower-income households and forces them to share in the cost of
risk reduction they are unlikely to pursue privately.”107 We can
withhold judgment about the rule’s regressivity for a moment, but
Bailey, Thomas, and Anderson’s claims suggest that the rule is—

102 For a thoughtful discussion of CBA and nonhuman animals, see generally Andrew
Stawasz, Why and How to Value Nonhuman Animals in Cost-Benefit Analysis (2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/SJV4-J6CL.
103 79 Fed. Reg. at 19,181.
104 See, e.g., David Undercoffler, Backup Cameras to Be Required in All New Vehicles,
Starting in 2018, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2014), https://perma.cc/M2JJ-76FT.
105 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to Collaboration and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON
REG. 167, 214–15 (2017); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in CostBenefit Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV. 1809, 1815–16 (2017); Sunstein, supra note 97, at 320–
24, 330–39.
106 James B. Bailey, Diana W. Thomas & Joseph R. Anderson, Regressive Effects of
Regulation on Wages, 180 PUB. CHOICE 91, 92 (2019).
107 Diana W. Thomas, Regressive Effects of Regulation, 180 PUB. CHOICE 1, 7 (2019).

2022]

Regulation and Redistribution with Lives in the Balance

687

at least plausibly—one with meaningful and worrisome redistributive effects.
B. The Agency’s Approach
NHTSA’s analysis of the rear-visibility rule was, in most respects, typical of agency CBAs—with the notable exception that
NHTSA adopted the rule notwithstanding its estimate that costs
exceeded benefits. The agency’s analysis largely tracked the description of status quo CBA in Part II.B. One slight difference is
that the clean-air example in Part II.A involved a public good (i.e.,
a good that is nonrival and nonexcludable), while rearview cameras have both private-good and public-good qualities. A substantial portion of the benefits of rearview cameras accrue to members
of the vehicle owner’s own household: NHTSA cited data indicating that the victim was a close relative of the person driving the
car in 41% of backover-death cases.108 But the bulk of the benefits
(59%) accrue to others. In this respect, rearview cameras are a
part-public–part-private good.
In the rear-visibility case, NHTSA estimated that the rule
would save 13–15 actual lives109 and 19.5–30.1 “equivalent lives”
per year.110 To calculate “equivalent lives” saved, the DOT instructs its agencies to use the Maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale
(MAIS), which rates nonfatal injuries from MAIS 1 (minor) to
MAIS 5 (critical). An example of an MAIS 5 injury is a ruptured
liver with tissue loss. MAIS injuries are then converted into VSLs
based on relative disutility factors prescribed in DOT guidance.
For example, at the time of the rear-visibility rule, avoiding an
MAIS 5 injury counted as saving 0.593 equivalent lives.111
NHTSA next multiplied its equivalent-lives estimate by a
VSL of $10.5 million, yielding monetized benefits of $205 million
to $316 million from fatalities and injuries avoided. The agency
then added $44 million–$57 million per year in benefits from property damage avoided and $16 million–$24 million in other societal
benefits (e.g., reduced medical expenses, insurance-administration
expenses, productivity losses, and collision-related legal expenses). All this resulted in an estimate of approximately
108 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FINAL
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: BACKOVER CRASH AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGIES FMVSS
NO. 111, at 20 (2014).
109 79 Fed. Reg. at 19,180.
110 Id. at 19,238; NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 108, at 97 tbl.VII-7.
111 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 108, at 25 tbl.III-8.
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$265 million to $396 million in monetized benefits per year starting in 2018.112
On the costs side, NHTSA focused on the costs of installing
rearview-camera systems. It estimated that the cost per vehicle
would be approximately $43 (or $45 with a slightly higher-cost
installation option) for vehicles that already have display screens.
For vehicles that do not have those screens, the cost would be
$132 (or $142 with a slightly higher-cost installation option).113
The agency assumed a 73% adoption rate for rearview cameras114
in the absence of the rule, with approximately sixteen million new
vehicles per year in total.115 Overall, it estimated that the cost
would be $546 million to $620 million to equip all model-year2018 vehicles that did not already have rearview-camera systems
in place.116
As noted, NHTSA adopted the rear-visibility rule notwithstanding the fact that monetized costs exceeded monetized benefits. This conclusion was driven by the agency’s assumption that
most new vehicles without cameras would not already have display screens. The agency’s estimate was that about 5% to 7% of
cars and light-truck vehicles without cameras would have display
screens used for navigation units by model year 2018.117 The overwhelming majority of new vehicles in the United States (98.8%)118
now have such screens. Of course, this does not mean that
NHTSA was wrong. Manufacturers may have chosen to install
those screens in order to comply with the rear-visibility rule. But
the display screens also allow cars to have onboard navigation
units, and having a navigation unit in a vehicle yields additional
benefits that NHTSA’s CBA ignores (e.g., reducing your risk of
getting lost). If the agency had used the $43 per vehicle cost—

112 79 Fed. Reg. at 19,238–39; NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra
note 108, at 97 & tbl.VII-7. The careful reader will note a $1 million discrepancy in the
high-end benefit estimate, which is attributable to rounding along the way.
113 79 Fed. Reg. at 19,236; NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 108,
at 83 tbl.VI-10.
114 See 79 Fed. Reg. at 19,179.
115 See id. at 19,236.
116 Id.; NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 108, at 83 tbl.VI-12.
117 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 108, at 30 tbl.IV-3. Specifically, NHTSA estimated that 39% of cars would not have cameras and that 2% of cars
would have navigation units without cameras (2% ⁄ 39% ≈ 5%). It also estimated that 15%
of light-truck vehicles would not have cameras and that 1% of light-truck vehicles would
have navigation units but not cameras (1% ⁄ 15% ≈ 7%).
118 See Keith Barry, Screen Stars: Which Infotainment System Deserves a Leading
Role in Your Next Car?, CONSUMER REPS. (Aug. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/WZ7B-8VDX.
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reflecting the minimum incremental cost of a rearview camera
once a vehicle already has a display screen—then the total monetized costs would have been approximately $186 million, well below the low-end estimate of monetized benefits.119 If it had used a
midpoint cost estimate (on the assumption that half of vehicles
would have had display screens but for the rule), then its total
cost estimate would have been around $380 million, which was
within the range of estimated benefits.120
Instead, the agency relied on “fairness and equity” considerations to justify its decision to adopt the rule.121 The fairness and
equity considerations mentioned by the agency, however, did not
relate to the distribution of income. Rather, the agency emphasized the fact that the victims of backover crashes are primarily
children, the elderly, and people with disabilities. “Especially in
the context at issue, such people lack relevant control over the
situation and are not in a good position to protect themselves,”
the agency explained. “There are strong considerations, rooted in
fairness and equity, to reduce these risks that they face.”122
NHTSA’s analysis of fairness and equity did not consider equity in terms of income and wealth. This is typical of agency rules,
which often do not consider income-distributive effects. The next

119 The above calculation reflects the agency’s assumption of sixteen million new vehicles per year, 73% of which already have rearview cameras built in.
120 Professor Arden Rowell argues that NHTSA could have justified the rule based on
benefits that the agency deemed “non-monetizable,” such as the emotional impacts on
drivers and victims’ family members when the victim is a child. See Arden Rowell, Partial
Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 723, 731 (2012).
Sunstein raises the intriguing possibility that the rule also might have been justifiable
based on the idea that rearview cameras are an “experience good,” meaning that “people
do not know their value until they have had experience with them.” Sunstein, supra
note 97, at 319. Sunstein reports results of an Amazon MTurk experiment finding “that a
lower bound of 74%” of respondents would “demand more than the high-end amount
($132–$142, for vehicles without such displays)” in order to give up the screens today. Id.
at 341. Interestingly, the 74% figure is close to the agency’s assumption at the time of the
rule that 73% of vehicles would have cameras by 2018. See id. at 335; NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 108, at 103.
The rule also might be justified on more conventional market-failure grounds: The
27% of buyers who wouldn’t choose camera-equipped cars in the absence of the rule still
derive some benefit from the cameras and from other functions enabled by display screens.
Those private benefits on their own might not be enough to warrant the purchase, but
adding the positive externality on top of the private benefits could potentially tip the balance. So either a subsidy or a mandate was plausibly necessary to align private purchases
with the social objective.
121 79 Fed. Reg. at 19,235–36 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,821
(Jan. 21, 2011)).
122 Id. at 19,236.
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Section will consider how NHTSA’s analysis might have changed
if it had accounted for those effects.
C. Income-Distributive Effects
How do the costs and benefits of the rear-visibility rule vary
by income? This Section seeks to answer that question. It explains
why—at least based on data sources available to NHTSA and empirical assumptions that the DOT has made in other contexts—
the rear-visibility rule appears to be regressive by most measures:
it imposes net costs on low-income groups and generates net benefits for high-income groups. Thus, NHTSA would be likelier to
reject the rule based on standard weighted CBA than based on
unweighted (distribution-neutral) CBA. This Section then explains why the conclusions of the previous two sentences depend
critically on the assumption that the VSL is income elastic. With
equal-dollar VSLs, the conclusions would flip entirely. Curious
readers can view and download all data and assumptions used in
this Article’s analyses.123
1. Costs.
Let’s start on the cost side. An initial question is whether
manufacturers will bear the costs of cameras or pass them along
to consumers. Cost pass-through is likelier to occur in a competitive industry, and automobile manufacturing is a competitive
industry. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission consider a market with a Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) below 1,500 to be unconcentrated,124 and the automotive industry’s HHI is less than half that.125 Moreover, data on
cost pass-through in the U.S. automobile market indicates that
cost shocks are passed through to consumers at least dollar for

123 See Daniel Hemel, Regulation and Redistribution with Lives in the Balance—Data
and Analysis for Rear Visibility Rule Case Study, bit.ly/rearvisibility.
124 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 5.3 (Aug. 19, 2010), https://perma.cc/8X9E-E9PB.
125 See Sam Korus, The Automotive Industry Is on the Threshold of Massive Consolidation, ARK INVEST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/Z46N-MGCM. This report acknowledges that current concentration is low but predicts that concentration will increase due
to the incipient shift toward electric vehicles.
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dollar.126 Accordingly, assuming complete cost pass-through appears to be appropriate.127
Which consumers will bear these costs? A decent first approximation is that costs will be distributed across income groups in
the same proportion that vehicles are distributed across income
groups. Thus, if households earning $100,000 own twice as many
cars as households earning $20,000, they will bear twice the costs
of the rule. This assumption may overestimate or underestimate
the income elasticity of regulatory costs (i.e., the change in regulatory costs as a function of the change in income). One reason
why it may overestimate the income elasticity of regulatory costs
is that higher-income households may be more likely to buy cars
with built-in navigation systems (which make it cheaper to comply with the rule). One reason why it may underestimate the income elasticity of regulatory costs is that higher-income households are likelier to buy new cars, whereas lower-income
households are likelier to buy used cars not initially subject to the
rule. Insofar as the rule raises the price of new cars, though, it
may raise the price of used cars as well, since used cars are a substitute for new cars.128 It would be miraculous if all these factors
balanced out perfectly, but, all in all, using the distribution of vehicles to estimate the distribution of costs is a reasonably good
guess.
Fortunately for our purposes, we know how vehicles are distributed across income groups because the DOT collects data on
precisely that subject. The National Household Travel Survey,
conducted by the Federal Highway Administration, includes information on the number of vehicles per household in different

126 See, e.g., Anne Gron & Deborah L. Swenson, Cost Pass-Through in the U.S. Automobile Market, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 316, 321 (2000) (noting that in response to exchange-rate shocks affecting input prices, “U.S. manufacturers actually increased dollar
prices more rapidly than their underlying increase in costs”). Gron and Swenson reject the
hypothesis of full cost pass-through for non-U.S. automakers. See id. However, the cost
increases contemplated here—mandates announced well in advance, with ample time for
manufacturers to adjust prices and quantities—are probably even more likely to be passed
through to consumers than the sudden cost swings studied by Gron and Swenson (who
focused on cost changes arising from exchange-rate fluctuations). I thank Matthew
Stephenson for this observation.
127 As emphasized in Part IV.C, cost pass-through assumptions—like income-elasticity
assumptions—will be critical to distributive analysis. For practical implications of this
observation, see infra note 212 and accompanying text.
128 See Thomas, supra note 107, at 6 & n.16.
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income bands.129 Accordingly, the analysis below allocates costs
across income groups in proportion to the number of vehicles per
household in those income groups. The following figures reflect scenarios in which vehicles already have display screens (Cost (low)),
in which vehicles do not already have such screens (Cost (high)), and
in which 50% of vehicles have screens (Cost (medium)).130
2. Benefits.
Now turn to the benefits, which are primarily attributable to
lives and injuries avoided. NHTSA’s regulatory impact analysis
indicates that approximately 41% of backover crash victims are
close relatives of drivers.131 For those crashes, I assume that
equivalent lives saved are distributed across income groups in the
same proportion that vehicles are distributed across income
groups. For the remaining 59% of equivalent lives saved, I assume
an equal distribution across the population.
This equal-distribution assumption for remaining equivalent
lives may overestimate or underestimate the income elasticity of
regulatory benefits (i.e., the change in benefits as a function of the
change in income). One reason why it might overestimate is that
high-socioeconomic-status individuals are generally less likely to
be car-crash victims.132 We do not know, however, whether the relationship between income and motor-vehicle injury risk holds
true for backover crashes. (It may be a function of the fact that
lower-income individuals ride in more dangerous vehicles,
whereas backover crash victims almost always are outside the
relevant vehicle.) One reason why the equal-distribution assumption may underestimate the income elasticity of regulatory benefits is that non-family-member backover-crash victims are likely
to be neighbors and acquaintances of the drivers, as these crashes

129 See National Household Travel Survey, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. (2017), available at
https://nhts.ornl.gov (choose “Households” as the analysis variable; then choose
HHFAMINC as the “row variable”; then choose HHVEHCNT as the column variable).
130 I use cost figures from the Final regulatory impact analysis: $131.60 per vehicle
where an entire camera system is required and $42.82 where a navigation unit already is
present so only camera and wires are needed. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., supra note 108, at 83 tbl.VI-10.
131 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 108, at 20.
132 See, e.g., Sam Harper, Thomas J. Charters & Erin C. Strumpf, Trends in Socioeconomic Inequalities in Motor Vehicle Accident Deaths in the United States, 1995–2010, 182
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 606, 610 tbl.3 (2015); Robert B. Noland, Nicholas J. Klein & Nicholas
K. Tulach, Do Lower Income Areas Have More Pedestrian Casualties?, 59 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 337, 339–43 (2013).
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generally happen either at the beginning or the end of vehicle
trips. If higher-income households are more likely to own vehicles
covered by the rule, and their neighbors and acquaintances are
also high-income, then benefits to non–family members still may
accrue disproportionately to high-income individuals.
Importantly, the income distribution of equivalent lives
saved matters only for purposes of textbook CBA, soft-weighted
CBA with income-elastic VSLs, and weighted CBA approaches
that use equal-dollar VSLs. Under status quo CBA, there is no
need to know the income distribution of equivalent lives saved
because all lives count the same in dollar terms regardless of income. In hard-weighted CBA with the standard assumptions—
weights inverse to income and an income elasticity of the VSL
equal to one—there is no need to know the income distribution of
equivalent lives saved because all lives count the same in welfareunit terms regardless of income. Soft-weighted CBA is, perhaps
ironically, harder to apply in this case than hard-weighted CBA
with the standard assumptions because soft-weighted CBA requires us to know where saved lives lie on the income distribution
and hard-weighted CBA doesn’t.133
As noted above, the rear-visibility rule also generates two
more types of benefits: benefits from avoiding property-damageonly crashes and “societal” benefits.134 The analysis below evenly
splits benefits from property-damage-only crashes between drivers and the rest of society. Societal benefits are allocated across
the population on a per capita basis. Since the bulk of benefits
(more than three quarters) are attributable to equivalent lives
saved, the distributive analysis will be largely robust to different
assumptions about the allocation of property-damage avoidance
and societal benefits.
3. Income elasticity of the VSL.
The final element of the distributive analysis entails transforming equivalent lives saved into dollar terms for different income groups. Again, this transformation depends on the income
elasticity of the VSL (i.e., the percent change in an individual’s
133 In this particular case, the fraction of equivalent lives saved that are within the
driver’s household turns out not to be a particularly influential parameter in the distributive analysis. The top-line regressivity and progressivity results remain the same
whether we assume that 0% of equivalent lives saved are in the driver’s household or that
100% are.
134 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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private VSL for every percent change in her income). As noted
above, logarithmic utility of income implies an income elasticity
of the VSL equal to one if all individuals value their own lives
equally in utility terms.
Empirical estimates of the income elasticity of the VSL vary
considerably. In a 2003 meta-analysis, Professors Kip Viscusi and
Joseph Aldy reviewed dozens of wage-risk studies across ten
countries and arrived at a point estimate of 0.5 to 0.6 for the income elasticity of the VSL.135 This implies that when income goes
up by 1%, willingness to pay for fatality risk reduction goes up by
0.5% to 0.6%. Consistent with those estimates, the DOT in 2011
adopted an income elasticity of the VSL equal to 0.55.136 As noted
above, the DOT applies the same VSL to everyone regardless of
income, but it adjusts the VSL year-to-year in light of real income
growth. The DOT’s income-elasticity assumption guides these
year-to-year adjustments.
After Viscusi and Aldy published their IEVSL meta-analysis,
Kaplow observed that IEVSLs substantially below one are difficult to reconcile with other widely accepted propositions of utility
theory. Kaplow conjectured that, given logarithmic utility of income, the IEVSL would be above one at lower incomes and would
fall toward one as income rises.137 Viscusi, along with Professors
Thomas Kniesner and James Ziliak, then reanalyzed data on
wage and fatality risks across industry-occupation groups in the
United States using a different empirical approach (quantile
135 See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 40 (2003).
136 For a review of changes to DOT guidance, see Memorandum from Peter Rogoff,
Acting Under Sec’y for Pol’y & Kathryn Thomson, Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to
Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm’rs, Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a
Statistical Life (VSL) in U.S. Department of Transportation Analyses – 2014 Adjustment
7–8 (June 13, 2014), https://perma.cc/3H4P-NN2X.
137 See Kaplow, supra note 86, at 25. As noted above, a reason why we might expect
the income elasticity of the VSL to exceed one—at least at lower income levels—is that
higher income yields greater utility (i.e., having more money likely makes life more pleasant). See supra text accompanying note 86. By contrast, the income elasticity of the value
of injury-risk reductions may be less than one (recall that NHTSA’s equivalent-life measure combines mortality and injury risk reductions). For example, one reason why I value
my hands is that they allow me to type. But if I had a very large amount of money, my
utility loss from a serious hand injury might be lower because I could hire someone else to
take dictation for me. It may be that higher income yields greater utility from being alive
but less utility from health attributes for which there are privately purchasable substitutes. In any event, the assumption that everyone derives the same utility from their lives
and their health regardless of income is useful as a starting point and, with logarithmic
utility of income, that equal-utility assumption translates to an income elasticity of the
VSL of one.
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regression). Income-elasticity estimates generated through this
method largely bear out Kaplow’s conjecture.138 For workers in the
tenth percentile by real family income, the estimated elasticity is
2.24; for workers in the ninetieth percentile, it is 1.23.139 The authors note that their results are broadly consistent with Kaplow’s
model.140 Another study by Professors Dora Costa and Matthew
Kahn, based on changes in wage-risk trade-offs in the U.S. labor
market from 1940 to 1980, similarly found an elasticity well above
one (in the range of 1.5 to 1.7).141
Citing these studies as well as Kaplow’s theoretical work, the
DOT updated its VSL guidance in 2013 to use an income elasticity
of the VSL of 1.0 going forward.142 Since the DOT uses the same
VSL for everyone regardless of income, the policy effect of this
update is not that the DOT favors rich people’s lives more than
poor people’s lives, but that the DOT values everyone’s lives more
as overall income rises. The DOT’s estimate of the income elasticity of the VSL nonetheless allows us to project how the agency
would calculate the benefits of the rear-visibility rule for different
income groups if it applied the same income-elasticity assumption
to its distributive analysis.143
4. Results.
Figure 1 illustrates the benefits and the costs of the rearvisibility rule across the income distribution, with the above
assumptions and an income elasticity of the VSL equal to one. To
138

Kniesner et al., supra note 72, at 19.
Id. at 28 tbl.2.
140 Id. at 19.
141 Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Changes in the Value of Life, 1940–1980, 29 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 159, 172–73 (2004); see also Ted R. Miller, Variations Between Countries in Values of Statistical Life, 34 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y 169, 177–79 (2000) (estimating that the income elasticity of the VSL is between 0.85 and 1.00).
142 Moran & Monje, supra note 33, at 8–9. As of 2016, the EPA was reconsidering its
own estimates of the income elasticity of the VSL. See Memorandum from Staff of the EPA
Off. of Air & Radiation & Off. of Pol’y, Recommended Income Elasticity and Income
Growth Estimates: Technical Memorandum 1–2 (Feb. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/P2BM7L9Z (articulating one approach that would yield a central-estimate income elasticity of
the VSL of 0.7 and another approach that would yield a central-estimate income elasticity
of 1.1). As of this writing, the review process does not appear to have culminated.
143 One question raised by the distributional analysis is how to estimate the income
(and thus the income-elastic VSL) of children. (According to NHTSA, children under
twenty accounted for more than one-third of backover fatalities between 2007 and 2011.
See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 108, at 23 tbl.III-5.) The analysis
here uses household income on the assumption that household income, rather than future
income, provides the best estimate of a child’s marginal utility of consumption.
139
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make interpretation easier (given different household sizes across
the income distribution), all figures reflect costs and benefits in
per capita terms. The three cost curves reflect alternative assumptions regarding the installation cost of cameras. Vertical lines reflect quintile bounds calculated by the Census Bureau ($20,000
for the bottom quintile, $38,000 for the second quintile, $61,500
for the third quintile, and $100,029 for the fourth quintile). All
figures are in 2010 dollars.144
Two observations emerge from Figure 1. First, while costs
and benefits both rise with income, the benefits curve (in blue) is
much steeper than the cost curves (red) at higher income levels.
Second, under all three cost assumptions, individuals at the bottom (left side) of the income distribution are made worse off by
the rule, and individuals at the top (right side) of the income distribution are made better off. The rear-visibility rule thus appears
to be a regressive regulation insofar as it redistributes from the
very poor to the very rich—with households in the middle experiencing either positive or negative net benefits depending upon installation-cost assumptions.

144 Table H-1: Income Limits for Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of All Households:
1967 to 2020, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last updated Nov. 2021), available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical
-income-households.html.
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FIGURE 1: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REAR-VISIBILITY RULE, BY
HOUSEHOLD INCOME (US$(2010)); INCOME ELASTICITY OF THE
VSL = 1
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As noted above, the hard-weighted approach to CBA would
evaluate the rear-visibility rule not based on an impressionistic
assessment of its progressivity or regressivity but is instead based
on a more formal weighted-welfare-unit analysis. To make results
more easily interpretable, I will use welfare weights that are the
ratio of mean household income to actual income (rather than one
divided by actual income, which would yield an inordinate number of decimal points). According to the Census Bureau, mean
household income in 2010 was approximately $67,000.145 So, for
example, a household with an income of $10,000 would have a
weight of 6.7, and a $1 gain to that household would count for 6.7
weighted welfare units. Likewise, a household with an income of
$100,000 would have a weight of 0.67, and a $1 gain to that household would count for 0.67 weighted welfare units.

145 Table H-5: Race and Hispanic Origin of Householder -- Households by Median and
Mean Income: 1967 to 2020, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last updated Nov. 2021), available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income
-households.html (data for all races).

698

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:3

To illustrate the difference between the hard-weighted approach and status quo CBA, Figure 2 shows weighted net benefits
and unweighted net benefits for households across the income distribution using an income elasticity of the VSL equal to one to
calculate benefits and based on the midpoint estimate of costs
(i.e., the condition that 50% of vehicles are already equipped with
display screens). Vertical lines again delineate quintile boundaries. Figure 2 graphically emphasizes the fact that under a
weighted approach, net costs to lower-income households count
for much more in the aggregate analysis than net benefits to
higher-income households.

Weighted (WU) and Unweighted ($) Net Benefits
-20
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-10
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0

FIGURE 2: WEIGHTED (WELFARE UNIT) AND UNWEIGHTED ($) NET
BENEFITS OF REAR-VISIBILITY RULE BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME;
MIDPOINT COST ESTIMATE; INCOME ELASTICITY OF THE VSL = 1
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To assess whether weighted and unweighted CBA would ultimately recommend the rule, one more piece of information is
needed—how income is distributed across the population. Based
on income data from the 2010 Census,146 the verdict under
146 Table H-3: Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of
All Households: 1967 to 2020, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last updated Nov. 2021), available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income
-households.html.
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weighted CBA is reasonably clear: the net effect of the rule, in
weighted-welfare-unit terms, is negative (−204 million weighted
welfare units across the population). Textbook CBA yields the
quantitative equivalent of a hung jury (−$9 million, which, given
the imprecision of estimates, amounts to a finding that costs and
benefits roughly balance out).
How would this analysis change if the DOT used weighted
CBA with equal-dollar VSLs rather than income-elastic VSLs? In
other words, what if we assigned a $10.5 million VSL to everyone
but still performed a distributive analysis? The short answer is
that everything would change. Indeed, key conclusions would reverse. Costs and benefits still would increase with income, but
now costs would increase more quickly than benefits. The upshot
would be that the rule generates net benefits at the low end of the
income distribution under all cost assumptions and net costs for
the highest-income groups under all but the most optimistic cost
assumptions.

0

Benefits/Costs (per person)
$1
$2

$3

FIGURE 3: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REAR-VISIBILITY RULE BY
HOUSEHOLD INCOME (US$(2010)); EQUAL-DOLLAR (POPULATION
AVERAGE) VSLS
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The effects of using equal-dollar (population average) VSLs
appear even more dramatic when costs and benefits are
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calculated in weighted welfare units (Figure 4). The gains to
households in the bottom two quintiles swamp losses in welfareunit terms elsewhere in the distribution. Using the midpoint cost
estimate, the net welfare effect of the rule is a gain of 56 million
weighted welfare units across the population. Weighted CBA with
equal-dollar VSLs provides the exact opposite recommendation
from the one we reached above.

Weighted (WU) and Unweighted ($) Net Benefits
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FIGURE 4: WEIGHTED (WELFARE UNIT) AND UNWEIGHTED ($)
NET BENEFITS OF REAR-VISIBILITY RULE BY HOUSEHOLD
INCOME; MIDPOINT COST ESTIMATE; EQUAL-DOLLAR
(POPULATION AVERAGE) VSLS
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In sum, based on NHTSA and the DOT’s own data and assumptions (including the assumption that the income elasticity of
the VSL equals one), the rear-visibility rule appears to fare worse
under a soft- or hard-weighted analysis than under an unweighted analysis. Importantly, though, this verdict hinges entirely on the income elasticity of the VSL. Distributive analysis
with equal-dollar VSLs (i.e., an income elasticity of the VSL equal
to zero) leads to diametrically opposite results. How to calculate
VSLs across income groups has enormously important implications for the weighted-CBA enterprise.
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D. Practical Implications
How would NHTSA’s decision have changed if the agency incorporated distributive objectives into its CBA—either through
hard-weighted CBA or through consideration of distributive effects as a soft variable—while maintaining its assumption that
the income elasticity of the VSL equals one? We are in the land of
speculation here, but one could imagine at least three possible
agency responses.
First, and least likely, NHTSA might have adopted an “incomedifferentiated” regulation. For example, NHTSA might have said
that the rearview camera requirement applies only to cars purchased by consumers with incomes over a certain threshold. It is
rather doubtful, though, that the agency would have had statutory authority to draw such a distinction. The enabling statute,
the K.T. Safety Act, authorized NHTSA to “prescribe different requirements for different types of motor vehicles.”147 It did not authorize NHTSA to prescribe different rules for different types of
drivers. Beyond the statutory authority question, an incomedifferentiated rule would be enormously difficult to enforce. (For
instance, would automobile dealers be required to check the
Form 1040 individual income tax returns of their customers to
verify income?) And a secondary market in camera-free cars
would undermine any effort to limit those vehicles to low-income
buyers.
Second, and somewhat more likely, NHTSA might have issued an “income-correlated” regulation—one that draws distinctions based on attributes associated with income rather than distinctions based directly on income. For example, 50% of SUV
buyers have household incomes above $75,000; only 43% of sedan
and truck buyers make that much.148 In an attempt to exempt
lower-income individuals from regulatory burdens, NHTSA
might have issued a rear-visibility regulation that applies to
SUVs but not to sedans and trucks. Shifting from explicit income
differentiation to income-correlated rules would substantially reduce the redistributive potential of regulations (the income profiles of SUV, sedan, and truck buyers are different—but not that
different). Income-correlated regulations will, however, address

147

K.T. Safety Act § 2(b), 122 Stat. at 640.
See New Buyer Demographics 2021
https://perma.cc/7VMA-Z76G.
148

(Updated),
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some of the enforceability challenges arising from explicit income
differentiation.
Third and finally, NHTSA might have adopted a generally
applicable policy informed by redistributive considerations. For
example, if NHTSA concluded that the rear-visibility rule would
impose inordinate costs on lower-income individuals, NHTSA
might have decided not to issue any rearview-camera requirement. This approach would mitigate some of the statutory and
practical challenges arising from income-differentiated and income-correlated rules. But it would even further reduce the potential for meaningful redistribution.149
Weighted CBA with equal-dollar VSLs, by contrast, would
encourage adoption of the rule with no exemptions or carveouts.
That is, it would offer exactly the opposite recommendation of
weighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs. While it may seem superficially attractive to maintain equal-dollar VSLs for all income
groups, note that the prescription generated by weighted CBA
with equal-dollar VSLs leaves lower-income individuals worse off

149 An interesting question for administrative law scholars is whether the third approach would even survive judicial review. Could NHTSA get away with saying that it was
adopting or not adopting a rule primarily because of distributive concerns?
NHTSA motor-vehicle safety standards—like other agency rules—are subject to the
criteria set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of
the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983),
which provides a gloss on the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious”
standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (stating that a court shall hold unlawful and set aside an
agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law”). The Court in State Farm emphasized that “[t]he scope of review
under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.” 463 U.S. at 43. The Court noted, though, that “[n]ormally,
an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider” or “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.” Id.
One could imagine arguments based on State Farm going in both directions. Advocates
of distributionally weighted CBA might argue that agencies, when not accounting for distributive effects, “entirely fail[ ] to consider an important aspect of the problem.” Or the
argument could go in reverse: that Congress sets redistributive policy through the taxand-transfer system and thus an agency regulating on the basis of its own distributive
judgments “has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider.” My own
view is that—just as “[t]he 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social
Statics”—the Administrative Procedure Act does not enact Professor Paul Samuelson’s
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). See generally Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,
36 REV. ECON. & STATS. 387 (1954) (laying the intellectual foundation for textbook CBA).
So, even though I ultimately don’t think agencies should apply hard or soft distributional
weights, I don’t think that the Administrative Procedure Act and State Farm categorically
preclude those approaches.
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under standard economic reasoning (and, indeed, commonsense
intuition).
Textbook CBA (i.e., unweighted CBA with income-elastic
VSLs) would potentially favor the first or the second approach.
Textbook CBA typically favors rules that require lower-income
individuals to purchase less safety. But once one decides to issue
a generally applicable rule, textbook CBA does not provide a reason for prioritizing lower-income individuals’ interests over
higher-income individuals’ interests. For rules that apply on a
population-wide basis, like the rear-visibility rule, textbook CBA
and status quo CBA largely align (though they may diverge if, for
example, a disproportionate number of lives saved by a regulation
are in higher-income or lower-income groups).150
In sum, the practical implications of distributionally
weighted CBA for the rear-visibility rule would be significant.
Weighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs would make it much
harder for NHTSA to justify the rule. (Weighted CBA with equaldollar VSLs would make it much easier.) The next Section considers whether weighted CBA would have similarly profound effects
on other lifesaving regulations.
E. Generalizability
To what extent are the conclusions of the rear-visibility-rule
case study generalizable to other important environmental,
health, and safety regulations? This Section seeks to shed light
on that question. It suggests that the rear-visibility rule is not a
one-off, though determining just how many major federal regulations would flunk weighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs will
require a case-by-case analysis beyond a single study’s scope.
Before diving into the details, a crucial caveat is in order. Distributive analysis is difficult. One cannot glance casually at a rule
and guesstimate its distributive effects very accurately. This is
for at least three reasons.
The first and most obvious reason is a lack of data. Because
agencies generally don’t analyze the effects of their regulations
across income groups, they usually don’t collect the sort of information that we would need for a comprehensive distributive
150 Here, there is actually a slight difference between textbook CBA and status quo
CBA. With midpoint cost estimates, the rule generates net costs of $9 million under textbook CBA and net costs of $37 million under status quo CBA. The gap—which is quite
small within the scheme of a rule this size—emerges because equivalent lives saved skew
modestly toward the higher end of the income distribution.
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analysis. For example, in the rear-visibility case, NHTSA’s Special
Crash Investigations (SCI) program probed fifty backover-crash
cases, gathering information that later helped the agency assess
whether the crash could have been avoided by rearview cameras.151 The agency’s summation of its SCI findings, though, included no information on the income of the driver or victim. Afterthe-fact distributive analyses of other rules are likely to encounter similar data limitations.
Second, the ultimate incidence of regulatory costs will not always be apparent even when the immediate incidence is clear.
Motor-vehicle safety standards are somewhat special in this respect because we have theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that manufacturers will pass costs through to consumers.152
In other cases, though, it will be much harder to determine
whether costs will be passed through and, if so, to whom. For example, who bears the cost of the DOT’s 2003 rule limiting the
number of consecutive hours that commercial motor-vehicle drivers can work without a break?153 Do owners of transportation companies pass on those costs to drivers in the form of lower total
wages, or do they pass on the costs to customers in the form of
higher prices, or do they bear the costs themselves in the form of
narrower profit margins? The answer is not obvious, and the results of any distributive analysis will almost certainly depend on
whether costs are borne by working-class truck drivers154 or by
shareholders of UPS and FedEx.
Third, and symmetrically, just as the incidence of regulatory
costs may be opaque, the incidence of regulatory benefits may be
difficult to discern. For example, local environmental improvements are likely to raise property values in affected areas,
151

See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 108, at 34–43.
See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
153 See Hours of Service of Drivers; Driver Rest and Sleep for Safe Operations, 68 Fed.
Reg. 22,456, 22,457 (Apr. 28, 2003) (limiting drivers to eleven hours of driving in their first
fourteen hours on a shift, after which they must take at least ten hours off before driving
again). For subsequent history, see Public Citizen v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 374 F.3d 1209, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (vacating the rule); Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part V, Pub. L. No. 108-310, § 7(f), 118 Stat. 1144, 1154
(temporarily reinstating the rule); 70 Fed. Reg. 49,978, 49,980 (Aug. 25, 2005) (readopting
the rule).
154 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, median pay for heavy- and tractortrailer truck drivers in 2019 was $47,130 per year. Occupational Outlook Handbook:
Heavy and Tractor-trailer Truck Drivers, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (last updated
Sept. 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/BJH5-UEVX. For delivery truck drivers, it was $34,340.
Occupational Outlook Handbook: Delivery Truck Drivers and Driver/Sales Workers, U.S.
BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (last updated Sept. 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/Y42W-5MQ3.
152
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benefiting homeowners but potentially pushing up rents.155
Nearly half of households with below-median family incomes are
renters,156 and the rate of renting is much higher (above 80%)
among households in poverty who receive public assistance.157
The interaction with rents poses the possibility that pollution control and hazard remediation will lead to environmental gentrification, displacing poorer residents of neighborhoods where environmental quality has improved.158
All this is to say that without careful case-by-case analysis,
broad generalizations about the distributive effects of environmental, health, and safety regulations are highly hazardous.
With that caveat in mind, though, we can make three limited
observations.
First, as Professors Dustin Chambers, Courtney Collins, and
Alan Krause document, lower-income households spend larger
shares of their incomes on goods and services in sectors subject to
more intensive federal regulation.159 This should not be terribly
surprising. Food, healthcare, transportation, and utilities are all
highly regulated industries. A household earning $200,000 will
likely spend more on (for example) food than a household earning
$20,000, but not ten times more. Thus, the income elasticity of
regulatory costs will generally be less than one (i.e., a 1% increase
in household income will lead to less than a 1% increase in regulatory costs). Chambers, Collins, and Krause infer from this finding that regulations therefore have a regressive impact.160 But, of
course, regulations generate benefits as well as costs, and we cannot reach definitive conclusions about the effects of regulations on
different income groups without knowing something more about
the distribution of benefits.

155 See Jacob L. Vigdor, Does Environmental Remediation Benefit the Poor?, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 52, 55–56 (Spencer Banzhaf ed., 2012).
156 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUARTERLY RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP
10 tbl.8 (July 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/KVU7-X3W4.
157 See H. Spencer Banzhaf & Eleanor McCormick, Moving Beyond Cleanup: Identifying the Crucibles of Environmental Gentrification, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 155, at 23, 23.
158 See id. at 36; NAT’L ENV’T JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, UNINTENDED IMPACTS OF
REDEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION EFFORTS IN FIVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
COMMUNITIES 2–4 (2006), https://perma.cc/42X7-RDCK.
159 See Dustin Chambers, Courtney A. Collins & Alan Krause, How Do Federal Regulations Affect Consumer Prices? An Analysis of the Regressive Effects of Regulation, 180
PUB. CHOICE 57, 66 tbl.1(2019).
160 See id. at 80–81.
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Second, with respect to motor-vehicle safety standards specifically, there are strong reasons to believe that these regulations
will fare worse under weighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs
than under status quo or textbook CBA. Consider, for example,
NHTSA’s 2009 roof crush-resistance rule, which the agency estimated would prevent 135 deaths and 1,065 nonfatal injuries per
year.161 NHTSA projected that the cost per equivalent life saved
would be between $6.1 million and $9.8 million,162 which rendered
the rule roughly break-even according to the agency’s then-current
VSL estimate.163 If a motor-vehicle safety standard is breakeven
overall, then it is very likely net negative for lower-income groups
with below-average VSLs and net positive for higher-income
groups with above-average VSLs. And with distributional
weights inverse to income, the net costs to lower-income households would count for much more in the aggregate analysis. Similar observations apply to other close-call NHTSA rules, like the
2001 advanced-airbags standard164 and the 2007 side-impactprotection update.165 Regulations that impose relatively constant
costs across income groups in exchange for largely uniform lifesaving benefits will struggle to survive under weighted CBA with
income-elastic VSLs.
Third, there is one area of regulation for which the literature
on distributive effects is large—air-pollution control. This literature yields two clear lessons with ambiguous implications. One
robust finding is that the costs of air-pollution control are larger
as a proportion of income for lower-income households than for
higher-income households.166 In this sense, pollution controls are
161 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance; Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 22,348, 22,377 (May 12, 2009).
162 Id. at 22,378 tbl.2.
163 Id. At the time, DOT guidance specified a VSL of $5.8 million. See id. at 22,377.
164 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 66 Fed. Reg.
65,376 (Dec. 18, 2001). Net benefits ranged from $140 million to $1.6 billion and net costs
from $400 million to $2 billion. See supra Table 1.
165 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Protection in Interior Impact,
72 Fed. Reg. 51,908 (Sept. 11, 2007). Net benefits ranged from $736 million to $1.06 billion
in 2001 dollars and net costs from $401 million to $1.05 billion. See supra Table 1. The
rear-visibility rule likely fares better in distributive analysis than other NHTSA motorvehicle safety standards because lower-income individuals—who might not buy cars subject to the standards—nonetheless capture a share of external benefits. Many other
NHTSA rules, like the roof crush-resistance and side-impact-protection standards, generate benefits primarily for the driver and her passengers, not for other motorists, cyclists,
and pedestrians.
166 See, e.g., Sarah E. West, Distributional Effects of Alternative Vehicle Pollution
Control Policies, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 735, 753–54 (2004) (modeling CAFE standards as a tax
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regressive.167 A second finding is that lower-income groups suffer
more from air pollution than higher-income groups do.168 Although
evidence regarding the relationship between income and exposure
to air pollution is mixed,169 the effect of exposure on mortality and
morbidity appears to be larger among lower-income groups.170
Possible explanations include that lower-income individuals are
more likely to suffer from underlying medical conditions, are less
likely to have healthcare access,171 and are less likely to have air
conditioning.172

on new vehicles that are large, and finding that lower-income households would pay a
larger proportion of their income than higher-income households); Sarah E. West &
Roberton C. Williams III, Estimates from a Consumer Demand System: Implications for
the Incidence of Environmental Taxes, 47 J. ENV’T ECON. & MGMT. 535, 551 tbl.3 (2004)
(finding that the burden of a gas tax as a proportion of income is higher for lower- and
middle-income households than for households in the top quintile under a variety of
demand-response scenarios); Sebastian Rausch, Gilbert E. Metcalf & John M. Reilly, Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing: A General Equilibrium Approach with Micro-data
for Households, 33 ENERGY ECON. S20, S25 (2011) (noting that lower-income groups spend
a larger fraction of their income on energy-intensive goods).
167 See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 800 (1993) (summarizing the
literature).
168 See Nicholas Z. Muller, Peter Hans Matthews & Virginia Wiltshire-Gordon, The
Distribution of Income Is Worse than You Think: Including Pollution Impacts into
Measures of Income Inequality, 13 PLoS ONE e0192461, at 3–5 (2018) (finding that lowerincome groups suffer larger health-related damages from air pollution, even though differences in exposure across income groups are relatively small).
169 Compare Paul J. Brochu, Jeff D. Yanosky, Christopher J. Paciorek, Joel Schwartz,
Jarvis T. Chen, Robert F. Herrick & Helen H. Suh, Particulate Air Pollution and Socioeconomic Position in Rural and Urban Areas of the Northeastern United States, 101 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH S224, S227 tbl.1 (2011) (finding that household income is negatively associated with particulate-matter levels in the Northeast), with Zhengyan Li, David M.
Konisky & Nikolaos Zirogiannis, Racial, Ethnic, and Income Disparities in Air Pollution:
A Study of Excess Emissions in Texas, 14 PLOS ONE e0220696, at 8–11 (2019) (finding
that household income is positively associated with particulate-matter levels in Texas).
170 See Matthew J. Neidell, Air Pollution, Health, and Socio-economic Status: The Effect of Outdoor Air Quality on Childhood Asthma, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 1209, 1228 (2004)
(finding that the effect of air pollution on childhood hospitalizations for asthma is larger
for children in lower-income households); Yan Wang, Liuhua Shi, Mihye Lee, Pengfei Liu,
Qian Di, Antonella Zanobetti & Joel D. Schwartz, Long-Term Exposure to PM2.5 and Mortality Among Older Adults in the Southeastern United States, 28 EPIDEMIOLOGY 207, 211
fig.2 (2017) (finding a stronger effect of particulate-matter exposure on mortality among
lower-income adults).
171 See Wang et al., supra note 170, at 211 (proposing lower baseline health and less
access to healthcare services as explanations for increased mortality); Sabit Cakmak,
Robert E. Dales, Maria Angelica Rubio & Claudia Blanco Vidal, The Risk of Dying on Days
of Higher Air Pollution Among the Socially Disadvantaged Elderly, 111 ENV’T RSCH. 388,
392 (2011) (suggesting healthcare access, smoking rates, and exposure to copollutants
such as occupational dust and fumes as explanations).
172 See Bell et al., supra note 63, at 685, and accompanying text.
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Only a few studies combine costs and benefits to assess the
overall effect of air pollution control across income groups, with
mixed results.173 Most recently, Professors Akshaya Jha, Peter
Matthews, and Nicholas Muller examine the overall distributive
effects of the EPA’s 2006 national ambient-air-quality standard
for fine particulate matter174 and its 2008 standard for ozone.175
After adjusting income to account for pollution-related damages,
the authors conclude that the two rules led to an increase in income inequality.176 They explain that benefits “accrue disproportionately to cities, which tend to have higher income on average
than rural areas.”177
These findings do not mean that EPA air-quality standards
will necessarily flunk distributionally weighted CBA. At least for
the highest-cost EPA regulations,178 the benefits so overwhelmingly exceed the costs that these regulations might survive CBA
even under the most unfavorable approach.179 Statutory limits on
the consideration of costs in the setting of national ambient-airquality standards also might ensure that the rules survive intact
173 Compare DAVID HARRISON, JR., WHO PAYS FOR CLEAN AIR?: THE COST AND
BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL AUTOMOBILE EMISSION CONTROLS 128–31 (1975)
(finding that the cost of automobile emission controls as a proportion of income is larger
for lower-income households than for higher-income households, while distribution of benefits by income is less clear), Robert Dorfman, Incidence of the Benefits and Costs of Environmental Programs, 67 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCS. 333, 337 & tbl.2 (1977) (estimating the benefits of pollution control based on self-reported willingness to pay and
finding that pollution control imposes net costs on lower-income households and yields net
benefits for higher-income households), and F. Reed Johnson, Income Distributional Effects of Air Pollution Abatement: A General Equilibrium Approach, 8 ATL. ECON. J. 10, 17
(1980) (finding that a sulfur-abatement policy in Sweden imposes net costs on low-income
groups and yields net benefits for high-income groups), with Leonard P. Gianessi, Henry
M. Peskin & Edward Wolff, The Distributional Effects of Uniform Air Pollution Policy in
the United States, 93 Q.J. ECON. 281, 294–95 tbl.VI (1979) (finding that industrial-airpollution controls impose net costs on higher-income households and generate net benefits
for lower-income households while automobile emissions controls impose net costs on all
income groups), and Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24
REGULATION 34, 38 (2001) (“[I]t appears that regulation under the Clean Air Act has
helped, and not economically harmed, the ‘have nots.’”).
174 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71 Fed. Reg.
61,144 (Oct. 17, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
175 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436 (Mar. 27,
2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50, 58).
176 Akshaya Jha, Peter H. Matthews & Nicholas Z. Muller, Does Environmental Policy
Affect Income Inequality? Evidence from the Clean Air Act, 109 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS &
PROCS. 271, 273 & tbl.1 (2019).
177 See id. at 274–75.
178 See supra Table 1.
179 With the one exception of the NAAQS for lead, the low end of the benefits range
exceeds the high end of the cost range for all the rules issued by the EPA alone in Table 1.
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even if weighted CBA recommends that they be modified.180 The
benefits and costs for motor-vehicle safety standards tend to be
somewhat less lopsided, though, so the potential for distributive
analysis to tip the balance is greater there. Moreover, NHTSA is
not prohibited from considering costs in setting federal motorvehicle safety standards, so it would have more leeway to adjust
those standards in light of redistributive objectives.
In sum, there are strong reasons to believe that the rearvisibility rule is not a one-off instance of a regulation that would
fare worse under standard weighted CBA than under status quo
CBA. At the same time, not every major federal environmental,
health, or safety rule will share the same distributive properties.
Thus, the claim here is not that weighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs will doom every lifesaving rule in Table 1; each regulation requires its own analysis. Weighted CBA with income-elastic
VSLs likely would swing the scales, though, in a number of
cases—particularly in motor-vehicle and other product-safety
contexts.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
This Part shifts from a descriptive register to a normative
one. It takes up two questions: (1) whether CBA should retain its
commitment to equal-dollar VSLs at all income levels and
(2) whether CBA should continue to be unweighted (i.e., distribution neutral). The analysis in this Part operates as a sort of metaCBA—a CBA about how we should do CBA. Meta-CBA, like firstorder CBA, entails difficult choices among imperfect options. I ultimately come down on the side of the status quo—unweighted
CBA with equal-dollar VSLs—though reasonable minds may differ. While I hope to convince readers of the bottom-line result, the
180 The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set primary NAAQS at levels that, “allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(b)(1). In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), the Supreme
Court interpreted that language to prohibit the EPA from considering “implementation
costs” in setting NAAQS. Id. at 486. In theory, the EPA might argue that poverty and
income inequality generate negative health effects, so income redistribution—by reducing
poverty and inequality—thereby serves to “protect the public health.” See, e.g., Eric Neumayer & Thomas Plümper, Inequalities of Income and Inequalities of Longevity: A CrossCountry Study, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 160, 160 & 165 nn.5–8 (2016) (compiling sources);
Beth C. Truesdale & Christopher Jencks, The Health Effects of Income Inequality: Averages and Disparities, 37 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 413, 426 & tbl.3 (2016) (describing evidence of strong relationship between disparities in life expectancy and income inequality).
But it is somewhat doubtful that courts would effectively allow the EPA to undo Whitman
by reframing cost considerations as poverty reduction.
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primary purpose of this Part is not to win converts but to make
trade-offs transparent.
The meta-CBA proceeds in four Sections. Section A considers
whether the choice among the various approaches to CBA can be
resolved on ethical grounds. For the most part, the answer appears to be no. Even if we take it as a given that the government
must accord equal value to all lives, alternatives to status quo
CBA still vindicate the equal-value-for-all-lives principle—they
just define value in welfare units rather than in dollar terms. Section B examines expressivist arguments for the various approaches. It considers whether the use of income-elastic VSLs in
an unweighted or weighted analysis might communicate disrespect for low-income individuals—either through the procedures
employed or the policies prescribed. This is a real cause for concern, though I will suggest some ways that practitioners of CBA
might be able to use income-elastic VSLs while mitigating expressive harms. Section C examines the different informational burdens imposed by various approaches to CBA. An advantage of the
status quo approach is that it significantly economizes on information costs. Section C also considers how the informational burdens of alternative approaches would interact with other agency
and executive policy priorities. Section D looks to the tax system.
It argues that the executive branch has options apart from distributionally weighted CBA that would allow the president to
achieve distributive objectives much more effectively.
A. Equal Value for All Lives?
For some readers, the question whether we should assign
equal values to the lives of rich people and poor people may seem
straightforward. As Professor Deborah Hellman writes (though
not in the CBA context), the “equal moral worth of all persons” is
a “bedrock moral principle.”181 There is, to be sure, a distinction
between assigning different VSLs and ascribing different moral
worth to different people.182 But even assuming that equal value
for all lives (or equal value for all life-years) is a moral or ethical
mandate, that won’t resolve the debate here (except perhaps to
further rule out one already-unattractive option).

181

DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 6 (2008).
See Benjamin Eidelson, Comment, Kidney Allocation and the Limits of the Age
Discrimination Act, 122 YALE L.J. 1635, 1647 (2013).
182
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A modification of philosopher Philippa Foot’s famous trolley
problem will serve to motivate the discussion.183 Imagine that the
driver of a runaway trolley can only steer from one track to another. On one track are 99,999 average Americans and on the
other track is the CEO of the world’s most valuable company, with
an income 100,000 times the average American’s. Let’s say that
the trolley company is state-owned, the driver is a government
employee, and (notwithstanding the fact that she is steering a
runaway trolley) the driver has the wherewithal to realize that
the lone man is the world’s richest person. Should the driver direct the trolley so that it hits the 99,999 average Americans
(whose combined income-elastic VSLs are $999.99 billion) and
avoids the CEO (whose income-elastic VSL is $10 million × 100,000 = $1 trillion)?
The question seems to be self-answering. One virtue of status
quo CBA is that it gets the modified trolley problem “right” in the
sense that it saves the 99,999 average Americans. But status quo
CBA is not the only approach that yields this outcome. Distributionally weighted CBA with the standard assumptions does too.
The average American’s distributional weight is one and her VSL
is $10 million, so the value of saving 99,999 average Americans is
999.99 billion welfare units. The CEO with an income 100,000
times the average American’s receives a distributional weight of
1/100,000; with an income-elastic VSL of $1 trillion, the value of
saving his life is ten million welfare units. Distributionally
weighted CBA with the standard assumptions easily chooses the
99,999 average Americans over the CEO. It just does so with an
extra arithmetic step.
On first glance, textbook CBA would appear to yield a different result. The CEO’s income-elastic VSL of $1 trillion trumps the
99,999 average Americans’ aggregate VSL of $999.99 billion. The
hypothetical is concededly contrived, but textbook CBA’s answer
to the hypothetical still seems startling.
On further inspection, though, it is not so clear that textbook
CBA really would favor the CEO over the 99,999 others. To see
why, let’s posit that utilitarianism is the correct approach to normative analysis. When utility is logarithmic in income, weighted
CBA
with
the
standard
assumptions
approximates

183 See PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, in
VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 23 (2d ed. 2002); Judith
Jarvis Thompson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395–96 (1985).
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utilitarianism.184 And recall that weighted CBA with the standard
assumptions yields equal values for all lives in welfare-unit
terms.
Now return to the Boadway-Keen model introduced in
Part II.A. When the tax system is optimal and weak separability
applies, textbook CBA gives us the same prescriptions that
weighted CBA would if weighted CBA were symmetrical. That is,
with weights inverse to income, an income elasticity of the VSL
equal to one, and consideration of both the welfare benefits of redistribution and the concomitant deadweight loss, textbook CBA
just spits out the answer that weighted CBA would give us (provided that the tax system is optimal).
Bringing this all back to the billionaire on the tracks, the
practitioner of textbook CBA can offer the following response to
the modified trolley problem:
Look, I’m really a utilitarian at heart who thinks the tax system is optimal, so I apply textbook CBA because it serves as
a short cut to the utilitarian solution. Since I think the tax
system is optimal, I think the welfare gain from additional
redistribution generally equals the welfare loss from additional labor–leisure distortions, so I ignore distributive effects and focus on efficiency effects in CBA. But if we stipulate that I can save 99,999 average Americans’ lives at the
cost of one multibillionaire’s life without any effect on
deadweight loss, then of course I will choose the 99,999 over
the one. After all, I’m really a utilitarian at heart. In more
realistic scenarios, there may be deadweight loss to worry
about, but if we stipulate that there isn’t here, then this case
is as easy for me as for the adherent to status quo CBA or
standard weighted CBA.
Somewhat surprisingly, the approach that is most difficult to
reconcile with the equal-value-for-all-lives principle is weighted
CBA with equal-dollar VSLs. To flip the modified trolley problem,
if there were a single average American on one track and 99,999
CEOs on the other, the practitioner of weighted CBA with weights
inverse to income and equal dollar VSLs would favor the average
American. The benefit of saving the average American would be
10 million welfare units, and the benefit of saving 99,999 CEOs
would be 99,999 × (1⁄100,000) × $10 million = 9.9999 million
184 Note again, though, that the approximation is not perfect under all scenarios. See
supra text accompanying notes 86–87.
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welfare units. The notion that we should sacrifice tens of thousands of average Americans to save a single billionaire is horrific,
but the notion that we would sacrifice tens of thousands of billionaires (if there were tens of thousands of billionaires) to save an
average American is no more palatable. Moreover, unlike in the
case of textbook CBA, we can’t reverse engineer a defensible
moral theory from weighted CBA with equal-dollar VSLs.
In sum, the ethical principle that all lives have equal value
potentially helps us further rule out weighted CBA with equaldollar VSLs, but it fails to resolve the debate among textbook
CBA, status quo CBA, and weighted CBA with the standard assumptions. The choice among those approaches will have to be
made on other grounds.
B. Expressive Harms
A second approach to the choice between equal-dollar VSLs
and income-elastic VSLs emphasizes expressive consequences. As
Professor Richard McAdams notes, claims about the content of
expression can refer to the meaning intended by the speaker (first
party), the meaning perceived by the audience (second party), or
the meaning as interpreted by a hypothetical reasonable person
(third party).185 Like McAdams, my focus is on the consequences
of expression, so I emphasize the second-party perspective: How
will individuals—lower-income individuals in particular—perceive the results of CBA with income-elastic VSLs? What message
will they glean from a procedure that assigns a lower dollar value
to their lives or from the policies that such a procedure prescribes?
And, most importantly, what welfare effects will follow from those
interpretations?
While scholars sometimes distinguish between “expressivist”
and “consequentialist” claims,186 the concern here about expressive harms remains entirely consequentialist. Individuals experience real harms from what they perceive to be expressions of disrespect. A law student suffers harm when a professor calls him
by the wrong first name. The student may be less likely to seek
out the professor for an independent study or a letter of
185 See RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 240–43 (2015) (presenting a typology of claims about law’s expressive power).
186 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1556 (2000) (arguing that constitutional
law “is pervasively oriented to expressivist, rather than to consequentialist, welfaremaximizing, or functional concerns”).
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recommendation down the road, and, even apart from that, he
may experience disutility in the moment. Whether the student
suffers harm does not depend on whether the professor meant any
disrespect (though the fact that the professor failed to predict and
avert the expressive harm may justify us in saying that the professor, consciously or not, did disrespect the student).187 Assigning
a precise number of dollars or welfare units to the harm may be
hard, though we could at least settle on a broad range—it’s not
$1, but it’s also probably not $10,000.
The argument here about income-elastic VSLs focuses on
harms of a similar sort. Let’s stipulate that practitioners of textbook CBA and weighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs do not
mean to communicate disrespect for low-income individuals by
assigning their lives a lower dollar value. Indeed, the practitioners’ motivation may be to improve the lot of low-income individuals. What matters to the welfarist, though, is not only what practitioners intend but also how the practice is perceived and what
consequences follow from those perceptions. And it is not hard to
imagine circumstances in which individuals would perceive the
use of income-elastic VSLs to be an indication of disrespect regardless of the practitioners’ intent.
Relevant expressive harms could arise through several channels. First, the very fact that agency officials assign lower-dollar
VSLs to lower-income individuals might itself give rise to expressive harms. Agencies publicly release regulatory impact analyses
(the documents that detail their CBAs), and they typically summarize key elements of the CBA in the preambles to proposed and
final rules published in the Federal Register. Although it is unlikely that many people will read regulatory impact analyses and
Federal Register notices in their original form, news reporters
likely will read these documents. Before deciding to use lowerdollar VSLs for lower-income individuals, practitioners of CBA
need to think about the consequences of news headlines

187 As Professor Benjamin Eidelson notes, the fact that an action “will predictably
appear disrespectful” in light of social conventions may mean that it is disrespectful in a
nonconsequentialist sense. Benjamin Eidelson, Respect, Individualism, and Colorblindness, 129 YALE L.J. 1600, 1621 fig.1 (2020). Treating other people “in a way consistent
with their value” requires one to consider their predictable reactions. See id. at 1619–21,
1621 fig.1. But the argument in the body text does not depend on the idea that disrespect
has “any moral importance apart from its effects.” Id. at 1621 n.63. The argument depends
only on the claim that policy makers should be concerned about the harms that they inflict
through their policies and through the procedures that they use to select their policies.
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declaring, for example, that the EPA and the DOT are discounting poorer people’s lives.
The concern is not purely about public relations. Virtually all
will agree that it is a bad thing if millions of Americans think that
the federal government values their interests less than the interests of other, richer Americans—and bad for reasons beyond the
fact that agency officials may endure a few difficult news cycles.
We derive utility from believing that federal officials are looking
out for our interests and disutility from believing that they are
not. Public confidence in government is a difficult-to-quantify
value, but it is not a trivial value. One consideration in the decision to use (or not to use) income-elastic VSLs should be whether
the practice will be interpreted as communicating a lack of concern for lower-income individuals’ interests.
Although this concern is serious, it is also partly mitigable—
at least in the hard-weighted CBA context. Insofar as the concern
arises solely from the use of different-dollar VSLs for individuals
of different incomes, the most straightforward solution is not to
use dollar VSLs. The typical approach to hard-weighted CBA is
to calculate net benefits in dollar terms for all individuals or income groups and then to convert those dollar terms into welfare
units via multiplication by distributional weights. But practitioners of hard-weighted CBA could take a different approach. They
could (1) calculate net nonmortality benefits for all individuals or
income groups, (2) convert those dollar terms into welfare units
by multiplying them by distributional weights, and then (3) add
net mortality benefits in welfare-unit terms without ever assigning dollar VSLs to anyone. Recall again that hard-weighted CBA
with the standard assumptions—distributional weights inverse
to income and an income elasticity of the VSL equal to one—assigns the same number of welfare units to all lives. So the practitioner of hard-weighted CBA with the standard assumptions
simply needs to know the standardized welfare-unit value of a life
or equivalent life and can proceed from there.188
This workaround to avoid the use of different-dollar VSLs for
individuals of different incomes won’t fully address a second potential channel for expressive harms. The policies prescribed by
the procedure presented in the previous paragraph will be the
same policies prescribed by hard-weighted CBA with income-

188 For a proposal along these lines, see generally E. Somanathan, Valuing Lives
Equally: Distributional Weights for Welfare Analysis, 90 ECON. LETTERS 122 (2006).
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elastic VSLs. This should come as no surprise, because the procedure presented in the previous paragraph is arithmetically identical to hard-weighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs. And it may
be that the policies prescribed—rather than the procedures employed—give rise to expressive harms.
Whether expressive harms manifest through this second
channel will depend critically on what types of policies result from
the use of income-elastic VSLs. As noted in Part III.D, policies
based on income-elastic VSLs can be explicitly income-differentiated
(e.g., lower safety standards for cars purchased by lower-income
individuals), income-correlated (e.g., lower safety standards for
sedans and trucks than for SUVs because sedans and trucks are
likelier to be purchased by lower-income individuals), or simply
redistribution-informed (e.g., lower safety standards across the
board to account for the interests of lower-income individuals).
The risk of expressive harm is likely decreasing from the first to
the third. If NHTSA explicitly said that lower-income individuals
can drive more dangerous cars because their lives are less valuable in dollar terms, then it is not hard to imagine that expressive
harms would manifest. On the other hand, very few people would
have interpreted a failure to adopt the rear-visibility rule for all
vehicles as a suggestion that lower-income individuals’ lives have
less value. The less narrowly tailored a rule is on the basis of income, the less likely it is to generate expressive harms. At the
same time, the less narrowly tailored a rule is on the basis of income, the less likely it is to significantly advance the efficiency
and welfare goals that underlie the use of income-elastic VSLs in
the first place.
The EPA’s unhappy experience with dollar-VSL differentiation may shed light on some of these expressive-harm concerns,
though it also may muddle the picture. The story begins in the
late Clinton years, when the EPA—in a series of rulemakings—
reported benefit estimates based on both VSLs and VSLYs.189 In
each instance, the EPA noted that it preferred the VSL approach.
In none of these rulemakings did the EPA explicitly say that it

189 See Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions
for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 65 Fed. Reg. 2,674, 2,721–22 (Jan.
18, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52, 97); Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards
and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 6,698, 6,785 & tbl.IV.D-7 (Feb.
10, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80, 85, 86); Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5,002, 5,107 &
tbl.VI.F-3 (Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 69, 80, 86).
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was assigning a lower dollar value to mortality gains accruing to
older Americans under the VSLY approach, though that is (usually) the effect of using VSLYs. In all three instances, the EPA’s
rulemaking resulted in more stringent air-quality standards. The
agency’s use of VSLYs in its alternative estimates elicited no public outcry (nor any apparent mention in the press).
Then, in 2002, the Bush administration unveiled a “Clear
Skies” proposal that would have amended the Clean Air Act to
allow broader use of cap-and-trade programs.190 In a technical
analysis of benefits associated with the Clear Skies plan, the EPA
reported an alternative estimate based on age-adjusted VSLs.
The agency explicitly said that its alternative estimate was based
on a VSL of $3.7 million for the general population and a mean
VSL of $2.3 million for seniors (all figures in 1999 dollars).191
The Natural Resources Defense Council and other environmental groups seized upon the EPA’s use of age-adjusted VSLs to
rally opposition to the Clear Skies plan.192 Ads in local newspapers
showed images of grandmothers with price tags stating, “Senior
Discount: 37 percent.”193 EPA officials encountered protests at
hearings in Tampa, Pittsburgh, Iowa City, San Antonio, and Los
Angeles.194 Bowing to public pressure, EPA administrator
Christine Todd Whitman disavowed the use of age-adjusted
VSLs in May 2003.195
Lost amid the “senior death discount” controversy was the
fact that EPA’s 2002 technical analysis actually assigned a higher

190 See Christopher Marquis, Bush Energy Proposal Seeks to ‘Clear Skies’ by 2018,
N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2002), https://perma.cc/7PTY-9KV9. The administration embraced
the Clear Skies proposal over an alternative EPA plan that would have led to faster airquality improvements. See Katharine Q. Seelye, White House Rejected a Stricter E.P.A.
Alternative to the President’s Clear Skies Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2002),
https://perma.cc/3AV9-ZHRS.
191 U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE
BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAR SKIES INITIATIVE 35–36 (Sept. 2002),
https://perma.cc/GH44-7MAK.
192 See Environmentalists Use ‘Senior Discount’ Issue to Buoy Alliances, INSIDE EPA’S
RISK POL’Y REP., June 24, 2003, at 5, 5–6; NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CHEAPENING THE
VALUE OF LIFE: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S DEATH DISCOUNT (2003),
https://perma.cc/5WZ6-N36C.
193 See Environmentalists Use ‘Senior Discount’ Issue to Buoy Alliances, supra
note 192, at 5–6.
194 See Cindy Skrzycki, Under Fire, EPA Drops the ‘Senior Death Discount’, WASH.
POST (May 13, 2003), https://perma.cc/JVG5-CVGK; Joseph Shapiro, EPA Criticized for
Plan to Reduce Value of Seniors’ Lives, NPR (May 5, 2003), https://perma.cc/5LHF-MVP4.
195 See Katharine Q. Seelye & John Tierney, E.P.A. Drops Age-Based Cost Studies,
N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2003), https://perma.cc/5HJY-KPQ5.
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value to avoided deaths for seniors than to avoided deaths for
younger Americans. The EPA surmised that forty-year-olds have
approximately thirty-five years of life remaining while the average senior has ten years. Translating age-adjusted VSLs into
VSLYs (assuming a 3% discount rate), the agency estimated that
forty-year-olds have a VSLY of $163,000 and seniors have a VSLY
of $258,000. The agency then assumed that individuals who die
prematurely as a result of particulate-matter exposure likely
would have had around five years of life remaining, regardless of
age. This yielded values of approximately $880,000 per avoided
death for under-65s in 2010 and $1.4 million per avoided death
for over-65s in 2010.196 (The agency assigned lower figures to individuals with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease on the assumption that they have even shorter life spans.) Startlingly, the
agency had applied a premium of approximately 58% for seniors,
not a 37% discount. As the agency explained:
The implied VSL for younger populations is less than that for
older populations because the value per life year is higher for
older populations. Since we assume that there is a 5-year loss
in life years for a PM related mortality, regardless of the age
of person dying, this necessarily leads to a lower VSL for
younger populations.197
One possible interpretation of the senior-death-discount episode is that the second-party expressive consequences of differentdollar VSLs lie beyond an agency’s control. If the EPA’s application of a senior death premium could be misconstrued as a senior
death discount, then there is no predicting how activists will recast agency CBAs. This, though, is not the only possible interpretation. As Professor Benjamin Eidelson notes, the reaction to
EPA’s analysis was not totally unpredictable: “[T]he suggestion
that some people’s lives were less worth saving was understandably heard to say that the people themselves were worth less.”198
Perhaps if seniors had carefully read the agency’s analysis, they
would have realized that the EPA actually was assigning a higher
value to mortality benefits for older Americans, but we cannot expect ordinary citizens to carefully parse CBAs. Activists and journalists told seniors that the EPA was valuing their lives at
$2.3 million and valuing younger people’s lives at $3.7 million—
196
197
198

See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 191, at 35–37.
Id. at 37.
See Eidelson, supra note 182, at 1648.
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and, while that was an oversimplification, it was not entirely
wrong. This is not to say that the content of agency CBAs should
be dictated wholly by worries about misinterpretation or spin. It
is to say, though, that a pragmatic approach to CBA should take
into account the risk that assigning different-dollar VSLs to different individuals will cause people to perceive that their government counts them for less.
The analysis so far has focused on second-party consequences
(i.e., consequences for the audience of CBA), but the use of incomeelastic VSLs may have first-party consequences too (i.e., consequences for agency officials). One might worry that when agency
officials regularly assign lower-dollar VSLs to lower-income individuals, this may routinize them into thinking that lower-income
individuals’ lives and health matter less. Defenders of weighted
CBA (and, by extension, textbook CBA) may respond that this is
all an illusion arising from the focus on dollars. After all, in welfare-unit terms, everyone’s life has the same value when distributional weights are inverse to income and the income elasticity of
the VSL equals one. But most of us are not used to thinking about
the world in welfare-unit terms; we are much more accustomed to
thinking in dollars. It is not crazy to worry that the practice of
assigning lower-dollar VSLs to lower-income individuals will
have a corrosive effect on agency officials’ attitudes toward the
poor even though that is not at all the underlying motivation.
There is a further dimension to the expressive-harm concern
that intersects with the discussion in the next section. Assigning
different-dollar VSLs to individuals of different income levels may
affect perceptions not only of government writ large but of CBA
specifically. One outcome of the senior-death-discount episode
was to provide CBA critics with a predictably effective avenue of
attack against the practice of assigning dollar figures to benefits
and costs.199 One might argue on principled grounds that we
should not yield to the heckler’s veto (especially if the heckler misunderstands or misconstrues the reason for income-differentiated
VSLs). At the same time, a committed welfarist should account
for all the likely consequences of a policy—including the consequences arising from predictable hecklers. The PR concern on
199 See, e.g., Christian Bourge, Analysis: Is Cost-Benefit Policy Flawed?, UNITED
PRESS INT’L (July 3, 2003) https://perma.cc/FC4U-FB58 (“An uproar in recent months over
the Environmental Protection Agency’s application of the economic valuation technique to
Bush administration clean air regulations has focused attention on the issue amid questions of [CBA’s] appropriateness as a policy tool.”).
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its own is probably not weighty enough to resolve the incomedifferentiated VSL debate (though the expressive harms highlighted in this Section go well beyond PR). But the EPA’s ageadjusted VSL experience—as well as the anticipated backlash
from using income-elastic VSLs in the future—should at least
prompt second thoughts about whether the potential gains
from using different-dollar VSLs justify the risk to the entire
CBA enterprise.
C. Informational Burdens and Their Institutional
Consequences
A further cause for concern regarding the use of incomedifferentiated VSLs and distributional weights emphasizes informational burdens and their institutional consequences. Each of
the alternatives to status quo CBA considered in Part II entails
significantly heavier informational burdens than the current approach. Textbook CBA requires us to determine not only how
many fatalities a regulation will prevent but also the distribution
of those avoided fatalities across income groups. Hard-weighted
CBA with the standard assumptions requires us to determine not
only how many dollars will be gained or lost by a regulation but
also the distribution of those dollar gains and losses. Softweighted CBA and versions of weighted CBA that use equaldollar VSLs present the worst of all worlds: they require us to
know both the distribution of avoided fatalities and the distribution of nonmortality net benefits, thus effectively doubling the informational burden on agencies.
Some of these informational burdens are manageable. As illustrated in Part III.C, it is possible in the case of the rear-visibility
rule to generate a decent estimate of the distribution of mortality
and nonmortality effects based on existing DOT data and several
not-implausible assumptions. But in other cases, distributional
analysis will not be so straightforward. As noted above, estimating the economic incidence of occupational-safety and air-quality
standards is difficult.200 Without careful attention to subtleties,
there is a real risk of making adjustments that not only fail to
achieve—but actually set back—redistributive goals.
The concern here is not solely a concern that CBA with distributional weights or income-elastic VSLs might be more difficult for agencies. Costs borne by agencies are social costs too, and
200

See supra notes 152–58 and accompanying text.
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the additional informational burden of more complex CBA may
divert agency officials from other important policymaking or enforcement priorities. But the increase in the costs of CBA may
have farther-reaching effects on federal administration.
For one thing, raising the cost of CBA may deter some agencies from engaging in the practice. As Professor Jennifer Nou illustrates, agencies have considerable leeway as to whether they
conduct CBAs at all.201 Agencies can, for example, seek to implement policies via adjudication rather than regulation, thus escaping Executive Order 12,866’s mandate that costs and benefits be
assessed and that proposed regulations be submitted to the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).202 Or they may
split a single regulation into several pieces so as to evade the requirement of formal CBA for actions with annual effects on the
economy of $100 million or more.203 Nou observes that agency
leaders sometimes pursue strategies of “self-insulation” because
their preferences diverge from the preferences of the president or
White House officials.204 In other cases, self-insulation may result
not from preference divergence but from resource constraints.
CBA can be burdensome, and agencies’ capacities are limited.205
A mandate for agencies to estimate the distribution of mortality and nonmortality effects across the income distribution
would raise the price of conducting CBAs. Even if OIRA provides
top-down guidance regarding relevant parameters (e.g., distributional weights and an executive branch–wide income elasticity of
the VSL), data collection and analysis will fall to the agencies.
This increase in the price of CBA may in turn give the agency
stronger incentives to self-insulate from centralized review (or
perhaps to refrain from regulating at all). In other words, the
harder that it is for agencies to perform CBA, the less likely that
they are to do it.
The worry about deterring agencies from engaging in CBA is
greater if the benefits of CBA are large. And CBA does more than
simply implement a particular notion of efficiency. As Sunstein
argues, one important function of CBA is to impose a check on

201 See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1755, 1776–77 (2013).
202 See id. at 1783–84.
203 See id. at 1792.
204 See id. at 1774–75.
205 See id. at 1775.
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cognitive biases.206 The practice of CBA “reduces people’s reliance
on intuitive judgments that sometimes go wrong, especially in
highly technical areas.”207 Professors Richard Revesz and Michael
Livermore add that CBA “can be used to ensure that [agencies’]
decisions are based on reasoned analysis and not, for instance, on
the unaccountable whim of an official or a bargain-hunting special interest.”208 CBA also can enhance the political accountability
of agencies by requiring them to justify their regulations in light
of the president’s priorities.209 And CBA may serve what could be
described as an “Elysian” function—representation-reinforcing
regulatory review210—by forcing agency officials to explicitly account for all members of society and their interests in the evaluation of proposed rules.
An increase in the price of CBA could mean less of all these
things. The price increase might be an expense worth bearing if
the use of different-dollar VSLs or distributional weights substantially improved the quality of the output. But there are reasons to
worry that it would have the opposite effect. These concerns apply
primarily to distributionally weighted CBA (rather than textbook
CBA with income-elastic VSLs), though some will apply to both.
First, for distributionally weighted CBA to improve welfare,
it not only needs to get its distributive analysis right on average;
it needs to be right substantially more often than not. When we
adjust legal rules away from efficiency, we bear a cost regardless
of whether any distributive benefit follows. If, on average, we redistribute very little but incur significant inefficiencies along the
way, then the net welfare effect will be substantially negative.
In many cases, the direction of the optimal redistributive adjustment will be uncertain.211 For example, the analysis of the

206 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
1059, 1072–73 (2000).
207 Cass R. Sunstein, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis a Foreign Language?, 72 Q.J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 3, 5 (2019).
208 RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 13 (2008).
209 See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1185–91 (2001).
210 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
86–88 (1980); Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, The Elysian Fields of the Law,
57 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2004).
211 This point is an extension of Kaplow and Shavell’s observation that redistributive
legal rules “may well overshoot the optimum.” Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 38, at 832.
The concern highlighted in the body text is a concern not just about overshooting but about
shooting in the wrong direction.
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rear-visibility rule in Part III.C depends entirely on the assumption that car manufacturers pass costs along to customers. If cost
pass-through does not occur and shareholders of car manufacturers bear the costs, then the rule is likely to be highly progressive
because households in the top income decile own approximately
90% of U.S. equities.212 If assumptions about cost pass-through
turn out to be wrong, agencies may end up rejecting, on redistributive grounds, regulations that would be not only efficient but
also would be redistributive.
Second, the sensitivity of distributive analysis to subtle modeling changes makes it more difficult for weighted CBA to serve
as a check on bias, whim, and interest-group capture. Agency officials who want to justify a particular policy often will be able to
justify that policy with the additional discretion that weighting
brings. Cost pass-through is one parameter that motivated
agency officials can modify in order to achieve their preferred results, but it is not the only one. For example, in the context of airquality standards, changes to assumptions about the effect of air
quality on rents will have important implications for distributive
findings.213 These concerns apply to some extent to textbook CBA
with income-elastic VSLs as well. For example, a regulator who
wants to justify an air-quality standard under textbook CBA
would do well to aggregate mortality data at the county level because mortality gains are likely to be greatest in high-income urban counties (though likely among the lowest-income residents of
those counties).214
To be sure, some of these same concerns apply to status quo
CBA. In the rear-visibility case, if NHTSA had wanted to show
that its rule was cost justified, it could have made the most favorable cost assumption (i.e., that cars by 2018 would come equipped
with display screens). But the fact that there is already play in
the joints of CBA is not a good reason to generate more. At the
very least, the additional opportunities for shading that come

212 See Robin Wigglesworth, How America’s 1% Came to Dominate Equity Ownership,
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/2501e154-4789-11ea-aeb3955839e06441; Heidi Chung, The Richest 1% Own 50% of Stocks Held by Americans,
YAHOO! FIN. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/HFR3-M6NZ.
213 See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
214 County-level aggregation potentially explains the result in Jha et al., supra
note 176, at 273 & tbl.1, which found that national ambient-air-quality standards increase
inequality. From a textbook CBA perspective, income-regressive distribution of mortality
gains will make total gains look greater.
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with weighted CBA should prompt thought about whether and
how to limit analytical flexibility.
Finally, the president could address some of the concerns related to the resource costs and deterrent effects of textbook CBA
or weighted CBA by giving agencies the option to use income-elastic VSLs, distributional weights, or both, rather than making
their use mandatory. Optionality, though, is not a panacea. Under an optional system, agencies could incorporate income-elastic
VSLs or distributional weights into CBA when it would make
their favored regulations look better and omit discussion of those
factors when it would make their favored regulations look worse.
This would potentially undermine one of CBA’s chief goals—
aligning agency policies with presidential priorities.215
Whether the president and OIRA are comfortable with this
optionality may vary from agency to agency and from administration to administration. Republican presidents will generally have
more reason to be concerned about agencies with liberal staffs
(e.g., the EPA) straying from the administration’s agenda, and
Democratic presidents will generally have more reason to be concerned about agencies with more conservative careerists (e.g., the
Pentagon).216 A particular president may decide that her control
over her administration is sufficiently secure that she can afford
to give agencies more slack. The judgment is difficult to assess in
the abstract. The key point for present purposes is that the use of
income-elastic VSLs and distributional weights can create tension with CBA’s diverse objectives. These concerns may not be decision determinative, but they certainly merit consideration as
part of a holistic evaluation of the various approaches.
D. Alternative Mechanisms for Redistribution
The expressive and informational concerns emphasized in
the previous two sections relate to both textbook CBA and
weighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs. A further argument for
the status quo emphasizes the availability of alternative policy
channels that are superior to nontax regulations as mechanisms
for redistribution. This argument specifically addresses the
215

See Posner, supra note 209, at 1185–91.
See, e.g., Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony Bertelli, Christian R. Grose, David E. Lewis
& David C. Nixon, Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341, 347–49 (2012); Mark D. Richardson, Joshua
D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Elite Perceptions of Agency Ideology and Workforce Skill, 80
J. POL. 303, 305 (2018).
216
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choice between distributionally weighted and unweighted approaches rather than the choice between textbook CBA and status quo CBA (both of which are unweighted).
Recall that the case for distributionally weighted CBA depends critically on the assumption that the existing tax-andtransfer system fails to accomplish the optimal amount of redistribution.217 (Optimality means that the welfare gains from additional redistribution equal the welfare losses; it does not mean
that taxes must be nondistortionary.) Thus, if the same decision
maker were to have control over the tax system and over agency
CBA procedures, there would be little reason to use distributionally weighted CBA. And the decision maker with control over
agency CBA procedures across the executive branch is, ultimately, the president, whose power over the tax system is vast.
At first glance, the notion that the president has control over
the tax system may seem strange. After all, in the United States,
Congress—not the president—holds the power to tax.218 On further inspection, though, this Schoolhouse Rock!219 vision of the
U.S. federal tax system becomes quite a bit more nuanced for several reasons:
The president wields enormous influence over tax legislation.
To some extent, this influence arises through the same channels
that allow the president to influence nontax legislation (e.g., the
bully pulpit and the veto pen).220 But for reasons rooted in congressional procedure, recent presidents have been more successful in pushing tax-and-transfer changes through Congress than
other changes. This is primarily because tax-and-transfer
changes can go through the fast-track, filibuster-proof budget-

217

See supra notes 60–69 and accompanying text.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
219 Schoolhouse Rock!: I’m Just a Bill (Scholastic Rock, Inc. Mar. 27, 1976).
220 No tax legislation has passed via veto override in 231 years of U.S. history. See
Vetoes, 1789 to Present, U.S. SENATE, https://perma.cc/AQ5Q-C6W9. The closest Congress
ever came to a veto override of a tax bill was the Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, where
the House fell fourteen votes short of overriding President Clinton’s veto. H.R. 8, 106th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2000). For the override vote, see Roll Call No. 458, CLERK OF THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Sept. 7, 2000), https://perma.cc/86LV-3GHL.
218

726

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:3

reconciliation process.221 Presidents Clinton,222 Bush,223 Obama,224
Trump,225 and Biden226 all achieved major elements of their distributive agendas via budget reconciliation. Sometimes, they did
so with the slimmest of majorities. For example, President Bush’s
second round of tax cuts in 2003 and President Trump’s 2017 tax
cuts both passed the Senate through the budget-reconciliation
procedure on a 51–49 vote.227 President Clinton’s 1993 tax hike228
was an even closer call—splitting the Senate 50–50, with Vice
President Al Gore breaking the tie. President Biden’s American
Rescue Plan Act[add drop] would have split the Senate 50–50,
with Vice President Kamala Harris breaking the tie, were it not
for the fact that one senator who opposed the legislation left town
before the vote to attend a family funeral.229
The upshot has been that the past five presidents all have
succeeded in transforming the federal tax-and-transfer system.
Using the budget-reconciliation process, President Clinton
pushed through Congress an 8.6-percentage-point increase in the
top statutory tax rate.230 President Bush then cut the top statutory rate on ordinary income by 4.6 percentage points and cut the
top rate on qualified dividends and long-term capital gains by a
remarkable 23.6 percentage points.231 President Obama’s
221 See Ellen P. Aprill & Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye
View, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 102–05 (2018).
222 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
223 See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10716, 115 Stat. 38; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 10827, 117 Stat. 752.
224 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029.
225 See An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.
226 See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4.
227 See Roll Call Vote 108th Congress - 1st Session, Vote Number 196, U.S. SENATE (May
23, 2003), https://perma.cc/FHB2-55XU (50–50 vote, tie broken by the vice president); Roll
Call Vote 115th Congress - 1st Session, Vote Number 303, U.S. SENATE (Dec. 2, 2017),
https://perma.cc/4X3F-MFU3 (51–49 vote); see also Hemel & Aprill, supra note 221, at
114–15, 120–26.
228 See Roll Call Vote 103rd Congress - 1st Session, Vote Number 247, U.S. SENATE
(Aug. 6, 1993), https://perma.cc/65EJ-Z6NH (50–50 vote, tie broken by the vice president).
229 See Richard Cowan, Makini Brice & David Morgan, Democrats Push Biden’s
$1.9 Trillion COVID Bill Through Senate on Party-Line Vote, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2021),
https://perma.cc/3HAR-EJ3X.
230 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13202, 107 Stat. at 461; Tyler Fisher,
How Past Income Tax Rate Cuts on the Wealthy Affected the Economy, POLITICO (Sept. 27,
2017), https://perma.cc/WT32-A2LP.
231 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 § 101(a)(2), 115 Stat.
at 41; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 §§ 301–02, 117 Stat. at 758–
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signature legislative accomplishment—the Affordable Care Act—
is not typically characterized as a tax law (except by Chief Justice
John Roberts),232 but its companion budget-reconciliation bill
raised the top tax rate by 3.8 percentage points.233 All in all, the
top marginal rate rose by a total of 9.6 percentage points in President Obama’s first term.234 President Trump succeeded in slashing the top marginal rate by 3.8 percentage points and the top
marginal rate on pass-through income by 11.2 percentage
points.235 President Biden has used reconciliation to significantly
expand—at least on a temporary basis—a wide range of cash and
near-cash transfers to lower- and middle-income households.236
Of course, the fact that these five presidents transformed the
federal income tax system does not mean that they ended up with
exactly the amount of redistribution they wanted. President
Obama, for example, sought further tax increases for the rich and
tax cuts for the middle class at the end of his presidency but was
unable to win support from a Republican-controlled Congress.237
Moreover, past performance is no guarantee of future results. Future presidents might have less success pushing a reconciliation
package through the House of Representatives and the Senate.
But even when their tax-legislation reforms fail in Congress,
presidents have other tools that they can use to influence the
amount of redistribution that occurs through the tax system.
First, the president controls the Treasury Department, and
the Treasury Department writes tax regulations. The president’s
power to effect more (or less) redistribution via tax regulation is

64; Danny Yagan, Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3531, 3536 (2015), https://perma.cc/B97Y-HRLN. The
true cut was even larger because of the suspension of the overall limitation on itemized
deductions in I.R.C. § 68. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
§ 103, 115 Stat. at 44–45.
232 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012).
233 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1402, 124 Stat. at 1060–61.
234 The 9.6 percentage points include the 4.6-percentage-point statutory rate increase,
the restoration of the Pease provision (which had effectively added 1.2 percentage points
to the marginal tax rate of top earners), and the 3.8% net-investment-income tax added
by the Affordable Care Act. I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 68(a)–(b), 1411.
235 The December 2017 tax law reduced the top statutory rate by 2.6 percentage points,
but it also suspended the Pease provision. See I.R.C. § 68(f). The additional rate cut for passthrough income occurs via the qualified-business-income deduction. See I.R.C. § 199A.
236 Press Release, White House, President Biden Announces American Rescue Plan
(Jan. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/F3ZE-4WN9.
237 See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Will Seek to Raise Taxes on Wealthy to Finance
Cuts for Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/6UXR-TYGL.
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far-reaching.238 For example, one of the most important questions
in corporate income taxation is whether an instrument will be
considered debt or equity (i.e., stock). Interest on debt is deductible to the corporation whereas dividends and distributions to
stockholders are not. Nontax lawyers might assume that a question this central to the tax system would be resolved by Congress,
but Congress has punted the question to Treasury. The treasury
secretary is authorized by statute to “prescribe such regulations
as may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated . . . as stock or indebtedness.”239 The Obama administration invoked this broad grant of
authority in 2016 to substantially limit the ability of corporations
to deduct interest paid to foreign affiliates.240 With authority to
define debt versus equity, a president (through her treasury secretary) has significant influence over the effective corporate income tax rate.
Or, to use another example, one of the primary mechanisms
of estate and gift tax avoidance today is the grantor-retained annuity trust (GRAT). The statute that authorizes GRATs also allows the treasury secretary to limit uses of GRATs that are “inconsistent with the purposes of this section.”241 The particular
provision authorizing the valuation method that makes it possible for taxpayers to pay no gift tax on their use of GRATs also
enables the treasury secretary to effectively turn off that valuation method.242 A president who wanted to increase redistribution
from the rich to the poor could instruct her treasury secretary to
promulgate regulations substantially limiting the use and abuse
of GRATs.243 President Obama’s last budget proposal included a
modification to the grantor-trust rules that would have raised
revenue by $19 billion over a decade,244 with virtually all of that
revenue coming from taxpayers in the top percentile. A motivated
Treasury Department likely could have implemented most if not
all elements of that proposal via regulation.245 Few changes to,

238 See Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power to Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 646–
76 (2017).
239 I.R.C. § 385(a).
240 See T.D. 9790, 2016-45 I.R.B. 540.
241 I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(iii).
242 See I.R.C. § 7520(b).
243 See Hemel, supra note 238, at 669–71.
244 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 269 (Feb. 2016), https://perma.cc/ZRP4-WFT8.
245 See Hemel, supra note 238, at 670.
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say, EPA or DOT regulations would have as large an impact on
income distribution as this one.
Beyond the president’s control over tax regulation, the president also can direct the IRS’s allocation of enforcement resources.
Professors Natasha Sarin and Larry Summers have estimated
that the IRS, by redirecting audit resources toward high-income
taxpayers, could raise roughly $500 billion over the next decade
from taxpayers earning more than $1 million.246 Even if that estimate is optimistic by an order of magnitude, it likely exceeds the
potential redistributive gains from refashioning all the rules in
Table 1 with redistributive goals in mind.
What I have described as “the President’s power to tax”247
places arguments for distributionally weighted CBA in an awkward position, at least insofar as they apply in the U.S. context.
The case for distributionally weighted CBA derives force from the
fact that we do not do enough to redistribute through the tax system. But the actor with the authority to implement distributionally weighted CBA across the executive branch—the president—
also has substantial authority over the tax system. If we could
persuade the president that the federal government should do
more to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor, the logical next step of the argument would not be to tell her to adopt
distributionally weighted CBA for nontax regulations. Instead, it
would be to tell her to pursue substantially more redistribution
through the tax system—and, if legislative avenues were blocked,
to do so through tax regulation and tax enforcement.
To be sure, it may be that even after the president pursues
redistribution vigorously through tax channels, she might remain
unsatisfied with the amount of redistribution that she has accomplished and be unable to persuade Congress to take further action
either. So the argument about the availability of alternative redistributive mechanisms does not logically defeat the case for distributionally weighted CBA when tax regulatory and enforcement
routes are exhausted and legislative reform is politically impossible. In that case, though, a president would need to compare
whatever additional redistributive benefits that she thinks she
can achieve via weighted CBA against the expressive, informational, and institutional costs emphasized above. The upshot is
not, then, that weighted CBA is never justifiable as an nth-best
246 See Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. Summers, Shrinking the Tax Gap: Approaches and
Revenue Potential 15 tbl.4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27475, 2019).
247 Hemel, supra note 238, at 716 (quotation marks omitted).
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response to the challenge of income and wealth inequality. But it
is at best a last resort—one that is dominated by other approaches
(including approaches that do not depend on congressional buy-in).
CONCLUSION: BEYOND CBA
The discussion so far has focused on agency CBA—and, specifically, agency CBA in the U.S. federal executive branch. This
Article’s central observation is that redistribution through lifesaving regulations will likely require policy makers, implicitly or
explicitly, to assign lower dollar values to lower-income individuals’ lives. The normative implications are less clear. A moral or
ethical commitment to the equal-value-for-all-lives principle
won’t resolve the debate: the three most viable approaches—textbook CBA, status quo CBA, and standard distributionally
weighted CBA with income-elastic VSLs—all adhere to the equalvalue-for-all-lives principle, albeit in their own ways. Concerns
about expressive harms favor the status quo approach, though
this factor on its own might not be enough to tip the balance. Concerns about informational burdens provide an additional argument for status quo CBA. The case for adding distributional
weights to CBA loses even more steam once one accounts for the
other redistributive options available to the executive branch.
Distributionally weighted CBA still might be a way to shift resources from the rich to the poor when all other avenues are exhausted, but the analysis here should cause advocates to rethink
whether the comparatively small upside is worth the considerable
costs.
On first glance, the debate over distributionally weighted
CBA and income-elastic VSLs might seem like it is of interest primarily to scholars and practitioners of federal administrative
law—and perhaps to those impacted by the lifesaving regulations
to which weighted CBA would potentially apply. The latter category is, to be sure, not a small universe: virtually all of us breathe
air, drink water, and drive or ride in vehicles affected by EPA and
DOT CBAs. (“Virtually all” rather than “all” to accommodate nonU.S. readers, though even they are impacted by agency CBAs that
affect U.S. carbon emissions levels.) But the implications go further. The case for distributionally weighted CBA is simply one
element of a broader argument over redistributive nontax legal
rules—an argument with implications well beyond the federal
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executive branch and well beyond the United States.248 What, if
anything, does the debate over CBA and income-elastic VSLs tell
us about that question?
Quite a bit, it turns out. Much of law involves tragic tradeoffs between dollars and lives.249 The COVID-19 pandemic has put
this point in the spotlight: large swaths of society are now governed by laws and rules that seek to strike a balance between
economic interests and lifesaving objectives. Since long before the
pandemic, these sorts of trade-offs have been particularly salient
in tort law. Tort law also happens to be the area in which the
academic debate about redistributive legal rules has been most
robust.250
Tort law’s approach to dollars-for-lives trade-offs contrasts
with CBA in some respects but aligns in others. As Professors Eric
Posner and Sunstein observe, the lodestar of economic damages
in wrongful death cases—future income minus expenses—is very
different from the emphasis in administrative law on VSLs derived from wage–risk trade-offs.251 Moreover, tort law’s focus on
lost earnings means that economic damages—like VSLs in textbook CBA but unlike VSLs in status quo CBA—are income elastic. On the other hand, as Professor Ariel Porat notes, courts do
not adjust the standard of care at the liability stage on the basis
of income.252 In this last respect, tort law’s approach shares similarities with status quo CBA’s income invariance. And in tort law,
as in textbook CBA and status quo CBA, the interests of lower-

248

See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17–21 (1978).
250 See, e.g., Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role
of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189–90 (1995); Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 37, at 669 (using a modification of a strict-liability rule as a motivating example);
Jolls, supra note 38, at 1657 (explaining that tort law’s focus “tracks that of much of the
existing literature on redistributive legal rules.”); Sanchirico, supra note 38, at 806 (“Tort
rules were chosen here because these are what are examined in the existing literature on
the question.”); Avraham et al., supra note 38, at 1132 (focusing on the tort regime as a
guiding example).
251 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 24, at 539–540.
252 See Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 86 (2011). If one
were to justify tort law’s chimerical stance—income neutrality at the liability stage, income elasticity at the damages stage—presumably it would be for reasons related to moral
hazard: we do not want to create situations in which individuals can earn far more in
death than in life. See id. at 102 n.53; ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN 107–09
(Penguin Books 1998) (1949).
249

732

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:3

income individuals do not receive greater weight formally or
informally.253
Some scholars argue that tort law should be modified to incorporate income-redistributive concerns. As Professor Christine
Jolls notes, these arguments typically focus on “tort rules that operate between strangers,” as opposed to “parties in a preexisting
contractual relationship.”254 The rationale for focusing on
stranger cases is that the distributive consequences are likelier to
stick. By contrast, a rule that favored lower-income litigants in
contract cases might make others less likely to enter into contracts with lower-income parties.
The stranger-tort setting is not all that dissimilar to the fact
pattern underlying Part III’s case study. Backover crashes have
been a frequent subject of tort litigation in recent years.255 In
Wright v. Ford Motor Co.,256 for example, a three-year-old boy was
killed when a woman driving a 2001 Ford Expedition failed to see
the boy as she reversed out of a parking spot.257 The boy’s parents
then sued Ford—presumably because they could not show negligence on the part of the driver. The parents argued that Ford
should have equipped the Expedition with features, such as a sensor or a camera, that would have allowed the driver to detect pedestrians behind her.258 This was a tort action among parties not
in privity: the Wrights versus the manufacturer of a car that was
not theirs. In this respect, it seems to be the paradigm case for
the redistributive-legal-rules argument.
253 Indeed, this income-neutrality principle is one of the first propositions about tort
law that students may encounter as 1Ls. See Vosburg v. Putney, 47 N.W. 99, 100 (Wis.
1890) (holding that it was improper to introduce evidence of the Vosburg family’s financial
condition and stating that “[t]he plaintiff, if he recovered, was entitled to full compensation
for his injury, no less and no more, whatever his pecuniary circumstances or those of his
father”).
254 See Jolls, supra note 38, at 1657; see also Avraham et al., supra note 38, at 1127
(emphasizing the centrality of the stranger-tort setting to the redistributive-legal-rules
debate); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistribution Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal
Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 177 (2003) (same).
255 See, e.g., Clemens v. Nissan Motor Co., No. 4-CV-2584, 2006 WL 8437219, at *11–
12 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2006) (entering judgment for the manufacturer after the jury found
that the lack of a backup camera did not render the SUV defective and that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent); Messerly v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 2010-CA-717, 2011 WL
6004318, at *11–15 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2011) (reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the manufacturer, and holding that whether the lack of a backup camera renders an SUV unreasonably dangerous is a question for the jury).
256 508 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2007).
257 Id. at 266–68.
258 See id. at 267–68. The jury ultimately found for Ford on the plaintiffs’ designdefect claim, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 266.

2022]

Regulation and Redistribution with Lives in the Balance

733

Wright is an unusually heart-rending case. But it is also, in
many ways, representative of the caseloads of U.S. courts. Motorvehicle-crash cases account for 35% of all trials in state courts,
58% of tort trials in state courts,259 and an even larger percentage
of stranger-tort cases. Very often, these are cases in which a fatality or serious injury has occurred. Redistribution through tort
rules—as through federal agency regulations—will often operate
in contexts where death looms in the background. We typically
abstract away from that fact when we argue about redistributive
tort rules. The discussion above shows why it ought to be at the
fore.
For one thing, until we specify the relationship between income and the value of fatality risk reduction, it is very difficult to
know even what a redistributive tort rule is. For example, the redistributive rule in Wright might seem like it would reallocate
from Ford to the plaintiffs, on the theory that Ford’s shareholders
are probably much richer than the plaintiffs. But if Ford responds
by installing rearview cameras in more of its vehicles and passing
on costs to consumers, then the distributive consequences look
more like those in Part III.C (i.e., heavily dependent on assumptions about the income elasticity of the VSL). The discussion in
Part III.E further shows that—even when we know the income
elasticity of the VSL—we still cannot easily guesstimate the direction of distributive effects. These inquiries often will depend
on costly data gathering and expert analysis. The litigants who
will be best positioned to perform those tasks and show that the
redistributive rule favors their side will likely be the ones who
already have more resources at the start. The very process of determining distributive effects in tort law could have perverse distributive consequences of its own.
The debate over redistributive tort rules remains highly theoretical. No one expects courts to flip a switch tomorrow and suddenly resolve tort cases with a view to the parties’ relative incomes. But in the agency context, the question of redistribution
via regulation becomes immediate. Practitioners of CBA need to
decide whether to apply equal-dollar VSLs or income-elastic
VSLs, and whether to apply distributional weights. This Article
has suggested reasons why the agencies’ current approach may
be the right one. But whatever approach agencies choose, they

259 See LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2 tbl.1 (rev. Apr. 4, 2009).
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should do so with a clear understanding of what exactly it might
mean to pursue income-redistributive objectives through lifesaving policies. Hopefully this Article has helped highlight some of
the implications of the various approaches in real-world settings.
At the very least, it serves to show just how much hangs in the
balance.

